Under the Dome – A Closer Look at Legislative Proposals Impacting Retirement

Q3 Social Sciences
Jack L. VanDerhei
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

How much might some of the recent legislative proposals for expanding access to employer sponsored retirement plans improve retirement income adequacy for current workers? This paper examines this by simulating the impact of some of the more important aspects of current legislative proposals, including: • Requiring retirement plans for all but the smallest employers. • Covering part-time employees. • Introducing auto portability. • Providing the option of guaranteed income for life from 401(k) and 403(b) plans. • Allowing open multiple employer plans (MEPs). • Modifying required minimum distributions. Previous research has shown that eligibility for participation in a defined contribution (DC) plan can have a significant impact on reducing retirement savings shortfalls. The analysis considers all workers (both eligible and ineligible) and gives the average individual retirement income deficits by the number of future years of eligibility for coverage in a defined contribution retirement plan. The deficit value for those in the youngest cohort (ages 35–39) assumed to have no future years of eligibility (as if they were never simulated to be employed in the future by an organization that provides access to those plans) is $78,046 per individual. That shortfall decreases substantially to $44,546 for those with one to nine years of future eligibility and even further to $27,830 for those with 10–19 years of future eligibility. Households in this age cohort fortunate enough to have at least 20 years of future eligibility in those programs have their average shortfall at retirement reduced to only $14,638. In other words, workers ages 35–39 with no future eligibility in a DC plan have a deficit more than five times higher than those with at least 20 years of future eligibility. The analysis shows the reduction in retirement deficits by age for three different coverage enhancements. Enhancement A assumes all employers are required to offer DC plans, save those with fewer than 10 employees. This analysis assumes that all new plans would be auto-IRAs with a 6 percent default contribution rate that escalates by 1 percent per year until it reaches 10 percent of pay. Based on experience observed from OregonSaves, a 30 percent opt-out is assumed for all new eligibles. • As expected, the youngest age cohort (35–39) would have the largest benefit — a 15.2 percent decrease in retirement deficit — since they would be exposed to the enhanced coverage for a long period of time. • Those in the 40–44 age cohort are simulated to have a 12.4 percent reduction in deficit. • Those 45–49 are simulated to have a 10.3 percent reduction in deficit. • Cohorts over 50 are also simulated to have reductions in retirement deficits; however, the reductions are less than 10 percent. Enhancement B is similar to Enhancement A, but with a cap on auto-escalation of 15 percent of pay. • In this case, the youngest cohort (those ages 35–39) is simulated to have a 17.0 percent reduction in retirement deficit. • Those in the 40–44 age cohort are simulated to have a 14.2 percent reduction in deficit. • Those ages 45–49 are simulated to have an 11.7 percent reduction in deficit. • Cohorts over age 50 are also simulated to have reductions in retirement deficits that are less than 10 percent. Enhancement C is similar to Enhancement B, except that all non-excludable employees are covered. • In this case, the youngest cohort (those ages 35–39) is simulated to have a 17.3 percent reduction in retirement deficit • Those in the 40–44 age cohort are simulated to have a 14.5 percent reduction in deficit. • Those 45–49 are simulated to have an 11.9 percent reduction in deficit • Cohorts over age 50 are simulated to have reductions in retirement deficits, but they are still less than 10 percent.
穹顶之下——对影响退休的立法提案的进一步观察
最近一些扩大雇主赞助的退休计划的立法提案,会在多大程度上改善当前工人的退休收入充足性?本文通过模拟当前立法提案的一些更重要方面的影响来检验这一点,包括:•要求除最小雇主外的所有雇主都有退休计划。•涵盖兼职员工。•引入自动携带功能。•提供401(k)和403(b)计划的终身保障收入选择。•允许开放多雇主计划(mep)。•修改所需的最小分布。先前的研究表明,参加固定缴款(DC)计划的资格对减少退休储蓄缺口有重大影响。该分析考虑了所有工人(包括符合条件的和不符合条件的),并给出了个人退休收入的平均赤字,按未来有资格参加固定缴款退休计划的年数计算。最年轻的群体(35-39岁)假定未来没有资格(就好像他们从未被模拟为未来被提供这些计划的组织雇用一样),其赤字值为每人78,046美元。对于那些未来有1到9年资格的人来说,这一缺口大幅减少到44,546美元,对于那些未来有10到19年资格的人来说,这一缺口甚至进一步减少到27,830美元。这个年龄段的家庭足够幸运,未来至少有20年的资格参加这些计划,他们退休时的平均缺口减少到只有14,638美元。换句话说,年龄在35-39岁之间,未来没有资格参加固定缴费计划的工人的赤字比未来至少有20年资格的人高出5倍多。分析显示,按年龄划分的退休赤字减少了三种不同的覆盖范围增强。增强A假设所有雇主都必须提供固定缴款计划,只有雇员少于10人的雇主除外。该分析假设所有新计划都是自动个人退休账户,默认缴款率为6%,每年增加1%,直到达到工资的10%。根据从OregonSaves观察到的经验,假设所有符合条件的新用户都有30%的选择退出。•正如预期的那样,最年轻的年龄组(35-39岁)将获得最大的好处——退休赤字减少15.2%——因为他们将在很长一段时间内接触到扩大的覆盖范围。•40-44岁人群的赤字减少了12.4%。•45-49岁人群的赤字将减少10.3%。•50岁以上的人群也被模拟为退休赤字的减少;然而,降幅不到10%。增强B类似于增强A,但自动升级的上限为工资的15%。•在这种情况下,最年轻的人群(35-39岁)的退休赤字减少了17.0%。•40-44岁人群的赤字减少了14.2%。•45-49岁的人的赤字减少了11.7%。•50岁以上的人群也被模拟为退休赤字减少不到10%。强化措施C与强化措施B类似,不同之处在于它涵盖了所有非排除性雇员。•在这种情况下,最年轻的人群(35-39岁)的退休赤字将减少17.3%•40-44岁人群的退休赤字将减少14.5%。•模拟45-49岁人群的赤字减少11.9%•模拟50岁以上人群的退休赤字减少,但仍不到10%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Social Security Bulletin
Social Security Bulletin Social Sciences-Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
CiteScore
0.70
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