The origins of gender-targeted public finance measures: the case of New Brunswick, Canada

Abstract

In recent years, there has been growing interest in policies that offer financial incentives to political parties to nominate women. Under what circumstances do political parties agree to adopt financial incentives for women’s representation? In this article, we conduct a feminist historical institutionalist case study of the adoption of gender-targeted public finance in the Canadian province of New Brunswick in 2017. We draw on a combination of: direct personal experience advocating for financial incentives for women candidates; interviews with party insiders, policymakers and actors within feminist organisations; and documentary evidence. The results have implications for understanding the potential for success of efforts to adopt financial incentives in other jurisdictions.Key messagesHistorical institutional choices, feminist actors and strategic political incentives led to gender-targeted public finance.Reforms that ‘tweak’ the system are easier to achieve than quotas or major system overhauls.Feminist actors and ideas are important but require the right sequence of events to produce change.Governments can be persuaded to adopt feminist policies when it is in their strategic interests.