Founder-Led Firms and Operational Litigation Risk

IF 1.7 3区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Mohammad Hashemi Joo, Edward R. Lawrence, Yuka Nishikawa
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract This study investigates the relationship between founder-led firms and non-securities (operational) litigation risk. We postulate lower operational litigation risk for founder-led firms than for nonfounder-led firms based on founder-CEOs’ limited agency conflicts and stronger emotional attachment to the firms they establish. Our empirical results suggest that having a founder as CEO mitigates the risk of being involved in operational lawsuits that could result in substantial financial losses and long-lasting negative consequences.
创始人领导的公司和运营诉讼风险
摘要本研究探讨创始人主导公司与非证券(经营性)诉讼风险之间的关系。我们假设创始人领导的公司的运营诉讼风险低于非创始人领导的公司,这是基于创始人-首席执行官有限的代理冲突和对他们所建立的公司更强的情感依恋。我们的实证结果表明,创始人担任首席执行官可以降低卷入运营诉讼的风险,而运营诉讼可能导致重大的财务损失和长期的负面后果。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.60
自引率
10.50%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: In Journal of Behavioral Finance , leaders in many fields are brought together to address the implications of current work on individual and group emotion, cognition, and action for the behavior of investment markets. They include specialists in personality, social, and clinical psychology; psychiatry; organizational behavior; accounting; marketing; sociology; anthropology; behavioral economics; finance; and the multidisciplinary study of judgment and decision making. The journal will foster debate among groups who have keen insights into the behavioral patterns of markets but have not historically published in the more traditional financial and economic journals. Further, it will stimulate new interdisciplinary research and theory that will build a body of knowledge about the psychological influences on investment market fluctuations. The most obvious benefit will be a new understanding of investment markets that can greatly improve investment decision making. Another benefit will be the opportunity for behavioral scientists to expand the scope of their studies via the use of the enormous databases that document behavior in investment markets.
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