Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities

Abstract

Les professeurs Macey et Miller analysent la relation entre lassurance des depots et l inade quation dans la structure des echeances des actifs et passifs des banques commerciales. Apres avoir critique lhypothese traditionnelle concernant la reglementation, dapres laquelle les banques sont incitees a financer les actifs a long terme par des passifs a court terme parce que lassurance des depots garantie par lEtat stimule le credit des banques et subventionne les passifs a court terme, ils utilisent lanalyse economique des decisions publiques pour soutenir quune version modifiee de lhypothese de la reglementation est la meilleure explication de la destructuration des echeances des actifs et passifs bancaires.Finalement, ils considerent que soutenir lhypothese de la reglementation nentraine pas l acceptation du modele dassurance des depots garantie par lEtat tel quil existe aux Etats-Unis aujourdhui.Professors Macey and Miller explore the relationship between deposit insurance and the mismatch in the term structure of commercial banks assets and liabilities. After criticizing the traditional regulatory hypothesis, which posits that banks have incentives to fund long-term assets with short-term liabilities because government-sponsored deposit insurance enhances bank credit and subsidizes short-term liabilities, they use public choice theory to argue that a modified version of the regulatory hypothesis is the best explanation for the mismatch in the term structure of banks assets and liabilities. Finally, they argue that embracing the regulatory hypothesis does not imply acceptance of the government-sponsored deposit insurance scheme as it exists in the U.S. today.