Consumer Return Policies in Omnichannel Operations

IF 0.1 4区 工程技术 Q4 ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING
Leela Nageswaran, Soo-Haeng Cho, Alan Scheller-Wolf
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引用次数: 93

Abstract

We study the pricing and return policy decisions of an omnichannel retailer serving customers who differ in how they realize their uncertain valuation for a product—by inspecting in store before purchase or by purchasing online and possibly returning misfit products. Customers may return misfit products either to stores for a full refund or online as per the firm’s return policy. We model prices to be identical across channels, allow crosschannel returns, and endogenize customers’ purchase and return decisions, capturing typical features of an omnichannel setting. Our analysis helps explain why some omnichannel firms choose full refunds, whereas others charge a fee for online returns. We find that omnichannel firms with good salvage partners for online returns (e.g., Nordstrom) as well as those with more store-based customers (e.g., Macy’s) should offer full refunds. Similarly, firms are incentivized to offer full refunds for products that customers are more likely to inspect in store (e.g., Express for footwear). In contrast, firms with a significant store network and better in-store salvage opportunities (e.g., J.C. Penney) might be better off charging a fee for online returns in order to nudge customers to return in store. Finally, an omnichannel firm should be cautious both in making the return process more convenient and in improving accessibility to its stores, because these seemingly beneficial policies, if combined with a partial-refund policy, could undermine the firm’s overall profit. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
全渠道运营中的消费者退货政策
我们研究了一个全渠道零售商的定价和退货政策决策,该零售商为不同的客户提供服务,这些客户在购买前在商店检查,或者在网上购买并可能退货不合适的产品。根据公司的退货政策,顾客可以将不合适的产品退回到商店全额退款或在线退货。我们将价格建模为跨渠道相同,允许跨渠道退货,并将客户的购买和退货决策内部化,捕捉全渠道设置的典型特征。我们的分析有助于解释为什么一些全渠道公司选择全额退款,而其他公司则对在线退货收取费用。我们发现,拥有良好的在线退货打捞合作伙伴的全渠道公司(如诺德斯特龙)以及那些拥有更多实体店客户的公司(如梅西百货)应该提供全额退款。同样,企业也会受到激励,为顾客更有可能在店内检查的产品提供全额退款(例如,速递的鞋类)。相比之下,拥有庞大的商店网络和更好的店内回收机会的公司(如J.C. Penney)可能会对在线退货收取费用,以促使顾客回到商店。最后,全渠道公司应该在使退货过程更方便和提高其商店的可及性方面都保持谨慎,因为这些看似有益的政策,如果与部分退款政策相结合,可能会损害公司的整体利润。本文被运营管理专业的Vishal Gaur接受。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Manufacturing Engineering
Manufacturing Engineering 工程技术-工程:制造
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
审稿时长
6-12 weeks
期刊介绍: Information not localized
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