Are Middle Managers’ Cost Decisions Sticky? Evidence from the Field

Byunghoon Jin, John C. Cary
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Abstract

Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman (2003) show that costs are “sticky” (i.e., costs change relatively less when sales decrease than when sales increase) because managers are reluctant to cut resources when sales decrease. We predict that cost behavior at the middle management level is sticky also when the magnitude of sales increase is sufficiently large, considering that middle managers have more limited ability in adding resources and are more risk averse. Using a survey instrument and interviews, we find evidence that middle managers’ cost decisions are sticky at both ends. Our findings are supported by empirical evidence based on segment-level data. DOI: 10.15458/ebr.85
中层管理人员的成本决策棘手吗?实地证据
Anderson, Banker和Janakiraman(2003)表明,成本是“粘性的”(即,当销售减少时,成本的变化相对小于销售增加时),因为当销售减少时,管理者不愿意削减资源。考虑到中层管理者增加资源的能力更有限,风险厌恶程度更高,我们预测当销售额增长幅度足够大时,中层管理者的成本行为也具有粘性。通过调查工具和访谈,我们发现中层管理人员的成本决策在两端都是粘性的。我们的发现得到了基于细分数据的经验证据的支持。DOI: 10.15458 / ebr.85
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