Game of government and forestry enterprise in the management innovation

Sun Wenqi, Cao Yukun
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Abstract

Innovation by forestry enterprise is very important to promote forestry enterprise's competition ability and economic development of state-owned forest. In this paper, evolutional game theory was used to construct the game model and study the behaviors of government and forestry enterprise regarding the innovation. Moreover, the strategy interaction and equilibrium between government and forestry enterprise were analyzed. This paper emphasizes the effect of impetus cost of government on the innovation behavior of forestry enterprise. The evolutionary equilibrium of game is that government reduces the outside cost from system so as to promote forestry enterprise to perform innovation, and government and forestry enterprise gain the innovative profits by continuously taking innovation.
政府与林业企业在管理创新中的博弈
林业企业的创新对于提高国有林业企业的竞争力和经济发展具有十分重要的意义。本文运用进化博弈论构建博弈模型,研究政府和林业企业在创新方面的行为。在此基础上,分析了政府与林业企业的战略互动与均衡。本文着重研究了政府激励成本对林业企业创新行为的影响。博弈的演化均衡是政府降低制度外部成本,促进林业企业进行创新,政府和林业企业通过持续创新获得创新利润。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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