Bidding behaviors in eBay auctions: secret reservation price and endogenous entry

IF 0.6 Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Feng Jiao
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper analyzes the secret reservation price in eBay auctions. Under the assumptions of secret and public reservation price, the bidders choose the optimal bidding function and the seller selects equilibrium reservation price. This model argues that the choice of secret reservation price is rational for the seller, as they can generate higher revenue in certain conditions. It predicts that, under endogenous entry, secret reservation price leads to higher revenue since it attracts more bidders to the auction. This effect is more noticeable for luxury goods. However, secret and public reservation prices generate identical revenue for the seller if entry is exogenous. Furthermore, the results are supported by numerous recent empirical works.
eBay拍卖中的竞价行为:秘密保留价与内生性进入
本文对eBay拍卖中的秘密保留价进行了分析。在保密保留价和公开保留价假设下,投标人选择最优竞价函数,卖方选择均衡保留价。该模型认为,秘密保留价格的选择对卖方来说是理性的,因为在某些条件下,他们可以产生更高的收入。它预测,在内生进入下,秘密保留价会吸引更多的竞标者参与拍卖,从而带来更高的收益。这种影响在奢侈品上更为明显。然而,如果进入是外生的,秘密保留价和公开保留价为卖方产生相同的收入。此外,研究结果得到了近期大量实证研究的支持。
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来源期刊
Economics Bulletin
Economics Bulletin ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
2
期刊介绍: The Economic Bulletin is an open-access letters journal founded in 2001 with the mission of providing free and extremely rapid scientific communication across the entire community of research economists. EB publishes original notes, comments, and preliminary results. We are especially interested in publishingmanuscripts that keep the profession informed about on-going research programs. Our publication standard is that a manuscript be original, correct and of interest to a specialist. Submissions in these categories are refereed and our objective is to make a decision within two months. Accepted papers are published immediately. It is expected that in many cases, manuscripts published in these categories will form the foundation for more complete works to besubsequently submitted to other journals. In all cases, submissions are restricted to seven printed pages exclusive of references, tables, figures, and appendices, and must be in PDF format. EB also publishes non-refereed letters to the editor, conference announcements and research announcements.
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