The Role of Hosting Providers in Fighting Command and Control Infrastructure of Financial Malware

Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, C. Gañán, Arman Noroozian, M. V. Eeten
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引用次数: 11

Abstract

A variety of botnets are used in attacks on financial services. Banks and security firms invest a lot of effort in detecting and combating malware-assisted takeover of customer accounts. A critical resource of these botnets is their command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure. Attackers rent or compromise servers to operate their C&C infrastructure. Hosting providers routinely take down C&C servers, but the effectiveness of this mitigation strategy depends on understanding how attackers select the hosting providers to host their servers. Do they prefer, for example, providers who are slow or unwilling in taking down C&Cs? In this paper, we analyze 7 years of data on the C&C servers of botnets that have engaged in attacks on financial services. Our aim is to understand whether attackers prefer certain types of providers or whether their C&Cs are randomly distributed across the whole attack surface of the hosting industry. We extract a set of structural properties of providers to capture the attack surface. We model the distribution of C&Cs across providers and show that the mere size of the provider can explain around 71% of the variance in the number of C&Cs per provider, whereas the rule of law in the country only explains around 1%. We further observe that price, time in business, popularity and ratio of vulnerable websites of providers relate significantly with C&C counts. Finally, we find that the speed with which providers take down C&C domains has only a weak relation with C&C occurrence rates, adding only 1% explained variance. This suggests attackers have little to no preference for providers who allow long-lived C&C domains.
托管提供商在打击金融恶意软件的指挥和控制基础设施中的作用
各种僵尸网络被用于对金融服务的攻击。银行和安全公司在检测和打击恶意软件入侵客户账户方面投入了大量精力。这些僵尸网络的一个关键资源是它们的命令与控制(C&C)基础设施。攻击者租用或破坏服务器来操作他们的C&C基础设施。托管提供商通常会关闭C&C服务器,但此缓解策略的有效性取决于了解攻击者如何选择托管提供商来托管其服务器。例如,他们是否更喜欢那些行动缓慢或不愿拆除c&c的供应商?在本文中,我们分析了7年来参与金融服务攻击的僵尸网络C&C服务器上的数据。我们的目标是了解攻击者是否更喜欢某些类型的提供商,或者他们的c&c是否随机分布在整个托管行业的攻击面。我们提取提供者的一组结构属性来捕获攻击面。我们对各个供应商的c&c分布进行了建模,结果表明,供应商的规模可以解释每个供应商的c&c数量差异的71%左右,而该国的法治只能解释约1%。我们进一步观察到,供应商的价格、营业时间、受欢迎程度和易受攻击网站的比例与C&C计数显著相关。最后,我们发现提供商删除C&C域的速度与C&C发生率只有微弱的关系,只增加了1%的解释方差。这表明攻击者对那些允许长时间使用C&C域的提供商几乎没有偏好。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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