Efficiency Loss and Coordination in the Online Shopping Supply Chain with Competitive Shipping Companies

Yihong Hu, Q. Qiang
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This paper studies efficiency loss and coordination mechanism in a supply chain with one online retailer and multiple competitive shipping companies in the presence of congestion effects. We build a three-level game between customers, shipping companies and the retailer. The equilibrium market structure is determined. The optimal volume–investment ratio for each shipping company is the same for both centralized and decentralized supply chains, and it is dependent on the delivery time function, independent of competitors’ decisions. The efficiency loss of the decentralized supply chain with one retailer and one shipping company is found to be 1/4, independent of the delivery time function and the demand function. The loss is reduced when competition is introduced into shipping companies and an upper bound of efficiency loss with multiple homogeneous shipping companies is derived. Revenue-sharing contracts may be designed to allow the decentralized supply chain to perform as well as a centralized one. The necessity of coordination is reduced when competition is introduced and the number of competitive companies increases. Finally, we extend the model to consider heterogeneous shipping companies and find that the disparity between shipping companies increases the efficiency loss because in the decentralized supply chain less efficient shipping companies also provide service. This research explicates the relationship options between e-commerce retailers and shipping companies, providing managerial insights for industry practitioners.
竞争航运公司网络购物供应链的效率损失与协调
本文研究了一个网络零售商和多个竞争航运公司存在拥塞效应的供应链的效率损失和协调机制。我们在顾客、运输公司和零售商之间建立了一个三级游戏。确定了均衡市场结构。对于集中式和分散式供应链,每个航运公司的最优体积投资比是相同的,并且它依赖于交货时间函数,独立于竞争对手的决策。发现一个零售商和一个运输公司的分散供应链的效率损失为1/4,与交货时间函数和需求函数无关。在航运公司中引入竞争可以减少损失,并推导出多个同质航运公司时效率损失的上界。收入共享合同可以设计成允许分散的供应链像集中的供应链一样运行。引入竞争,竞争企业增多,协调的必要性就会降低。最后,我们将模型扩展到考虑异构航运公司,发现航运公司之间的差异增加了效率损失,因为在分散的供应链中,效率较低的航运公司也提供服务。本研究阐明了电子商务零售商与航运公司之间的关系选择,为行业从业者提供管理见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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