Causal Closure of Physics and the Formulation of Physicalism

Abstract

Physicalism is an ontological doctrine according to which everything in the world is physical in the last instance. This is usually interpreted as a claim that every non-physical, most notably every mental property can either be reduced to some physical property or shown to supervene on it. The main obstacle in an attempt to formulate physicalism properly is Hempel’s dilemma, and the most promising strategy of taking this dilemma is based on the argument from causal closure of physics. After analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of this approach, I argue that it is highly controversial and thus unable to support a strong ontological commitment. UZROCNA ZATVORENOST FIZIKE I FORMULISANJE FIZIKALIZMA Fizikalizam je ontoloska doktrina prema kojoj je sve na svetu u poslednjoj instanci fizicko. Ovo se obicno interpretira kao tvrdnja da se svako nefizicko, a posebno mentalno svojstvo može redukovati na neko fizicko svojstvo, ili se može pokazati da na njemu supervenira. Glavna prepreka pokusajima da se fizikalizam adekvatno formulise je Hempelova dilema, a strategija suocavanja sa ovom dilemom, koja najvise obecava, bazirana je na argumentu uzrocne zatvorenosti fizike. Nakon analize dobrih i losih strana ovog pristupa, zakljucujem da je on jako kontroverzan i da samim tim nije u stanju da podrži snažnu ontolosku tezu. HIGHLIGHTS Physicalism is an ontological thesis according to which everything in the world is physical. Hempel’s dilemma makes it hard to formulate. The argument from causal closure of physics is the most promising physicalist strategy against Hempel’s dilemma. An elaboration of the argument from causal closure of physics based on the fundamental conservation laws and forces is presented. A thorough analysis of this approach indicates that it is highly controversial and unable to support physicalist thesis.