Anne Peters, Animals in International Law

Abstract

The “animal turn,” prompting us to question the hegemonic understanding of animals as mere resources, is gaining increasing attention in legal academic literature.1 Animals in International Law is, therefore, a helpful guide for this period, providing a comprehensive picture of the ways in which animals are affected by domestic and international law. The book provides detail and clarity about the way animals are classified in the eyes of the law and in academic literature, such as the distinction between domestic and wild animals. It also reviews the treatment of animals by different institutions and in different contexts, such as in the European Union. The book explains the significance of international law for animals, detailing its impact on regional, national and local policy. We are beginning to experience a paradigm shift in legal scholarship due to growing work on concepts such as Earth system law, which acknowledges that law has tended to privilege humans to the detriment of other natural entities, widening the definition of legal subjects deserving of rights to include non-humans.2 However, Earth system law and related movements focus on systems, rather than individuals, which means that the interests of the individuals within these systems are subsumed in the pursuit of a utilitarian greater good. Professor Anne Peters draws on her historically grounded previous work, including on international human rights law, to make the case in Animals in International Law for the importance of individual non-human rights.3 Chapter I notes that there is no international treaty that grants rights to animals in a broad sense, or that accords them universal standards of welfare.4 The book also addresses the sparse legal provisions in international law on wild animal welfare specifically, adding to the growing body of scholarly literature focusing on this question.5 Furthermore, in Chapter I, Animals in International Law puts forward the assertion that where international law leads, it sets a precedent that others follow. Peters argues that the international codification of fundamental rights for animals would convey both practical and symbolic benefits (24). Further elucidated are the reasons why current legal systems are not wholly adequate for the enactment of animal rights because these systems are designed for purposes to further human interests, which directly conflict with these goals. Current legal systems, she explains, are not zoo-centric. For example, the private and corporate rights model and rights of nature (469) protect the interests of humans, their assets, and ecosystems as a whole, but not