The consequences of legal pluralism for an interdisciplinary researcher

Abstract

it is less often practiced or appreciated. In part, this is understandable, as different disciplines have their own terminology, methods, implicit assumptions, conventions and measures of worth and importance. Despite these hurdles, the study of legal pluralism provides a continuing opportunity for truly interdisciplinary research. Many legally plural circumstances are highly complex, contested and beyond the grasp of existing analytical tools. However, importantly, analytical messiness does not necessarily mean that normative judgements cannot be made in assessing their effectiveness in delivering justice, dignity, redress and personal security. For instance, legal pluralism may allow for checks and balances that are simply not possible within a unitary legal system (Berman 1983). Conversely, legal pluralism may lead to legal dissonance, where different legal orders undermine each other, leading to a low-enforcement-high-crime situation that may be most detrimental to the weakest and most marginalised in society (Larcom and Swanson 2015). While the economic analysis of law has many limitations, it is particularly useful for focusing the essence of the legal circumstance and the consequences. Perhaps legal pluralism scholars could benefit from more interaction with the law and economics, empirical legal studies and institutions literatures, where the focus of enquiry is often centred on the consequences of legal arrangements – and how they can be improved. It is also hoped that authors from these literatures will engage more with the rich legal pluralism literature. There is much to learn from all sides. Finally, it is worth reflecting on the fact that, even if after 40 years, the illusion of legal centralism has been destroyed. For some it certainly has, and there is no doubt that the term has grown in prominence over this period. For instance, according to Google Books Ngram Viewer (2021) that aims to measure the frequency of use of words and phrases, the term “legal pluralism” overtook “socio-legal” in the mid-1980s, “law and society” in the mid-2000s, and “law and economics” in the early-2010s.2 However, despite having grown in prominence, the term means different things to different people, disciplines and generations. I hope that at the heart of its meaning remains the idea that law can derive legitimacy from sources other than the state. For it is this key insight, as destructive as it is and as antically messy as it can make things, that allows us to better see reality as it is, and to therefore make descriptive, analytical and normative advances.