Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity

D. Lichtman, Mark A. Lemley
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引用次数: 65

Abstract

The United States Patent and Trademark Office is tasked with the job of reading patent applications and determining which ones qualify for patent protection. It is a Herculean task, and the Patent Office pursues it subject to enormous informational and budgetary constraints. Nonetheless, under current law, courts are bound to defer to the Patent Office's decisions regarding patent validity. In this Article, we argue for reform. Deference to previous decision-makers is appropriate in instances where those previous decisions have a high likelihood of accuracy, and the patent system should endeavor to create processes that fit this mold. But granting significant deference to the initial process of patent review is indefensible and counter-productive. Patents should be vulnerable to challenge until and unless they are significantly evaluated in an information-rich environment. At that point, they will have earned and therefore should be accorded a presumption of validity. Such an approach would better serve the patent's systems long-run incentive goals, and it would give patent applicants better incentives to file for genuine inventions but leave their more obvious and incremental accomplishments outside the patent system's purview. Here, we therefore suggest the creation of a two-tier system of patent validity, with patents that are subject to intensive scrutiny accorded a strong presumption of validity, while untested patents are left to be evaluated more fully in court.
专利法有效性推定再认识
美国专利商标局的任务是阅读专利申请,并确定哪些申请有资格获得专利保护。这是一项艰巨的任务,专利局在执行这项任务时受到巨大的信息和预算限制。尽管如此,根据现行法律,法院必须服从专利局关于专利有效性的决定。在本文中,我们主张改革。在先前的决策具有很高准确性的情况下,尊重先前的决策者是适当的,专利制度应该努力创造符合这种模式的流程。但是,对专利审查的初始程序给予极大的尊重是站不住脚的,而且会适得其反。除非在信息丰富的环境中对专利进行重大评估,否则专利应该容易受到挑战。到那时,它们就已经获得,因此应该被假定为有效。这种方法将更好地服务于专利制度的长期激励目标,它将给专利申请人更好的激励来申请真正的发明,但将他们更明显和渐进的成就置于专利制度的范围之外。因此,在这里,我们建议创建一个专利有效性的双层系统,受到严格审查的专利被赋予强有力的有效性假设,而未经测试的专利则留给法庭进行更全面的评估。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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