Investigating nuclear-armed North Korea's “strategic” challenge and options for the United States and South Korea

Pub Date : 2022-07-11 DOI:10.1177/22338659221112990
H. Park
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Abstract

This study analyzes the challenge of North Korea, which has managed to have a strategic level of nuclear weapons and suggests a few options for the United States and South Korea to address this challenge. For this purpose, it examines the theoretical backgrounds of the extended deterrence and minimal deterrence strategies, as well as the contrasting perceptions of North Korea's nuclear armament. Then, it analyzes the competition between U.S. extended deterrence and North Korea's minimal deterrence strategy and evaluates a few possible options to deal with the current strategic level of the North Korean nuclear threat. Through its analysis, this study ascertained that North Korea developed its nuclear weapons to make the United States leave South Korea and to reunify Korea on its terms. North Korea adopted a minimal deterrence strategy to counter-deter the U.S. extended deterrence and came to have considerable capabilities to implement the strategy, such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and potentially SSBNs. The United States and its allies in Northeast Asia should clearly recognize the opportunity cost of failed denuclearization negotiations and consider more options than strengthening the current U.S. extended deterrence posture. They need to seriously discuss the establishment of another nuclear-sharing system in Northeast Asia and should not exclude the nuclear weapons development option of South Korea.
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调查拥有核武器的朝鲜对美国和韩国的“战略”挑战和选择
本研究分析了朝鲜的挑战,朝鲜已经成功地拥有了战略级别的核武器,并为美国和韩国提出了一些应对这一挑战的选择。为此,本文考察了延伸威慑和最小威慑战略的理论背景,以及对朝鲜核军备的不同看法。然后,分析了美国的延伸威慑战略与朝鲜的最低威慑战略之间的竞争,并评估了应对朝鲜核威胁当前战略水平的几种可能选择。通过分析,本研究确定了朝鲜发展核武器是为了使美国离开韩国,并按照其条件统一朝鲜。朝鲜采取了最低限度的威慑战略来反制美国的延伸威慑,并逐渐具备了实施该战略的相当大的能力,例如洲际弹道导弹、潜射弹道导弹和潜在的ssbn。美国及其东北亚盟友应该清醒地认识到无核化谈判失败的机会成本,并考虑更多的选择,而不是加强美国的延伸威慑态势。他们应该认真讨论在东北亚建立另一个核共享体系,不应该排除韩国的核武器开发方案。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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