Hedge Fund Regulation, Performance, and Risk-Taking: Re-Examining the Effect of the Dodd-Frank Act

Fernán Restrepo
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank”) on the profits and risk-taking of the hedge fund industry. Dodd-Frank subjects most hedge funds to government inspections, requires them to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and imposes a number of disclosure and compliance obligations. According to the SEC and other authorities, these measures were intended to protect investors from misrepresentation of fund performance and increase the control of systemic risk; but the industry opposed the law, claiming that compliance costs would substantially affect the profitability of the industry and that the new obligations were unnecessary given the relatively sophisticated nature of hedge fund investors. The empirical evidence on the effect of Dodd Frank on profitability and risk-taking, however, is limited. This paper, therefore, contributes to filling this gap. The results show that, relative to a control group of funds that were already regulated or largely exempted from regulation, the newly regulated funds experienced a significant decrease in reported profits but not in risk (as proxied by volatility). The funds that became subject to the obligation to file Form PF (a new form created as part of the implementation of Dodd-Frank, which focuses on performance and volatility data) actually experienced a decrease in risk, but this result should only be interpreted as suggestive given some limitations of the data. In addition, the analysis suggests that the decline in reported profits among the newly regulated funds was not driven by compliance costs, as predicted by the industry. Rather, the results indicate that the decline can be reasonably attributed to greater conservativism in financial reporting. Taken together, the results contradict some commentators’ suggestion that the reduction in reported returns following Dodd-Frank represents a “partial government failure.”
对冲基金监管、业绩和风险承担:重新审视多德-弗兰克法案的影响
本文考察了多德-弗兰克法案(“多德-弗兰克”)对对冲基金行业利润和风险承担的影响。多德-弗兰克法案要求大多数对冲基金接受政府检查,要求它们在美国证券交易委员会(SEC)注册,并规定了一系列披露和合规义务。根据SEC和其他当局的说法,这些措施旨在保护投资者免受基金业绩的虚假陈述,并加强对系统性风险的控制;但该行业反对这项法律,声称合规成本将严重影响该行业的盈利能力,而且鉴于对冲基金投资者相对复杂的性质,新的义务是不必要的。然而,有关《多德-弗兰克法案》对盈利能力和冒险行为影响的实证证据有限。因此,本文有助于填补这一空白。结果表明,相对于已经受到监管或基本上不受监管的基金对照组,新受到监管的基金报告利润显著下降,但风险(以波动率为代表)没有下降。那些必须提交PF表格(一种新表格,是多德-弗兰克法案实施的一部分,主要关注业绩和波动性数据)的基金实际上经历了风险的降低,但考虑到数据的一些局限性,这一结果只能被解释为暗示。此外,分析表明,新受监管的基金报告利润的下降,并非像业内预测的那样,是合规成本造成的。相反,结果表明,这种下降可以合理地归因于财务报告中更大的保守主义。综上所述,这些结果与一些评论人士的说法相矛盾,他们认为多德-弗兰克法案后报告收益的减少代表了“部分政府的失败”。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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