{"title":"Political Economy of Antitrust Policy in the United States","authors":"建军 周","doi":"10.26599/peo.2023.9310103","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n 过去一百多年里,因应保护小生产者、消费者福利、国际竞争力、世界战争等国内国际因素,受哈佛学派、芝加哥学派等占主导地位的政治经济意识形态影响,美国的反垄断政策目标在不同的时期各有侧重。无论是主动的还是被动的,围绕并购重组的反垄断政策一直扮演着“胡萝卜加大棒”的角色,深刻地影响着美国的市场结构、企业行为与产业发展。从实际政策效果来看,无论是“胡萝卜”还是“大棒”政策,都未能切实阻止美国企业并购重组的总体趋势。尤其是,自20世纪70、80年代以来,无论是美国政府的反垄断指数的提高,还是生产、研发、营销和采购环节合作的许可,或是在特定领域的反垄断豁免,都使美国企业旨在实现规模经济与技术创新的并购重组在更大程度上成为可能,也引领和塑造了美国半导体、飞机制造业和微软公司被控垄断案的方向。在全球产业集中和竞争依然激烈的大背景下,后发国家如何在做好有效监管的同时通过并购重组培育本土大企业,美国这样的发达国家关于反垄断政策的经验和教训值得研究参考。\n","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"250 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"政治经济学季刊","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.26599/peo.2023.9310103","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}