Mathematical economics in the Soviet Union

Abstract

The time has come for a summary, no matter how perfunctory. The trouble with rapid surveys of this kind is that the inevitably arbitrary selection process introduces a strong bias. It is quite likely that we have erred in two directions: (1) by including material that has meanwhile been superseded by theoretically weightier results; and (2) by indulging in a mildly avuncular bit of “adumbrationism,” a bit of belated and not quite communicable enthusiasm for the tempo of improvement in Soviet theoretical economics that may look uncalled for and even awkward in the years to come.

For the sake of balance, let us say that we do not think Soviet mathematical economics has as yet reached or surpassed Western economics in its plenitude of the topics dealt with and its depth and subtlety of the very best achievements. But they are catching up fast. It should also be remarked that in many East European countries (Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania) excellent work is being done in mathematical economics and operations research, as well as in econometrics.

As far as econometrics (in its narrower sense) is concerned, the lag is far greater. In one respect it is bound to remain great for the simple reason that the Russians are not “competing” with us in this domain. Given their order of priorities, there is simply no motivation to channel much energy into our type of econometric endeavor.

Unrelated to this observation, it must, however, be recorded that the quality of the statistical know-how in what can loosely be described as Soviet econometric work barely deserves a passing grade. By and large, what we have seen in this respect is at the stage of Western work in the 1930's. We are at a loss to explain this phenomenon, for at least three reasons would make one conjecture that the opposite was true: (1) the very high level of Soviet work in probability theory—which is, after all, the basis of statistical methodology; (2) the enormous amount of statistical data collected over the years (but—and that is the point—perhaps not of the “right kind”); (3) the many opportunities to eschew politically sensitive issues by the device of “letting the facts speak for themselves”—facts brought to light, of course, by statistics.

We said at the beginning that a certain convergence of Western and Soviet economic thought and economic techniques seemed more than likely to us. At this juncture we hope that the reader will see why we think so. Such a convergence, incidentally, has literally nothing to do with the likelihood of convergent developments in economic institutions, a likelihood that has received a (from our point of view) very pessimistic appraisal by students of reality on both sides.