In Defence of the Normative Account of Ignorance.

IF 0.8 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-06-26 DOI:10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7

Anne Meylan

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard's alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.

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为 "无知的规范性解释 "辩护。

关于无知的标准观点认为，无知仅仅是缺乏知识或真实信念。邓肯-普里查德（Duncan Pritchard）最近反驳了这一标准观点，认为无知是由于不恰当的探究而导致的知识/真实信念的缺乏。我将把普里查德的另一种说法称为 "规范说"。本文的目的是通过提供支持规范说的独立论据来加强规范说。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

ERKENNTNIS PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

11.10%

发文量

116

期刊介绍： Erkenntnis is a philosophical journal publishing papers committed in one way or another to the philosophical attitude which is signified by the label ''scientific philosophy''. It concentrates on those philosophical fields which are particularly inspired by this attitude, although other topics are welcome as well. These fields are:- Epistemology - Philosophy of science, foundations and methodology of science in general and of natural and human sciences such as physics, biology, psychology, economics, social sciences in particular - Philosophy of mathematics - Logic, philosophy of logic, and all kinds of philosophical logics - Philosophy of language - Ontology, metaphysics, theory of modality - Philosophical psychology, philosophy of mind, neurophilosophy - Practical philosophy, i.e. ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of law, etc. One of the objectives of Erkenntnis is the provision of a suitable platform for the discussion of controversial issues; another is the provision of timely, competent reviews of important publications in an ever-growing field of research.In recent years, philosophers standing quite outside the pale of analytic philosophy have also paid careful, and indeed most welcome, attention to precision of concept and language, to arguments, and to well-grounded foundations. Erkenntnis provides for them, and for philosophers of all persuasions, a place of meeting, of discussion, and of disputation.Erkenntnis was originally founded in 1930 by Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, it was revived in 1975 by Carl G. Hempel, Wolfang Stegmüller, and Wilhelm K. Essler. You can find more information about this in the article “Hempel: The old and the new ‘Erkenntnis’” accessible in the tabs to the right.Today, Erkenntnis is one of the leading journals in philosophy worldwide and attracts first-class authors at all stages of career; from young philosophers at the PhD level up to established academic philosophers and highly renowned senior scholars. We pride ourselves on supplying our authors with substantial referee reports, subject to a turnaround time of about three months until the first decision. The acceptance rate for publications in the journal is presently slightly below 10%.