Developing a Spoofer Error Envelope for Tracking GNSS Signals

Abstract

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) are the most significant service for global positioning and timing. The high relevance and wide spread of these systems contrast with the risk for interference or even manipulations of GNSS signals. One specific threat is GNSS spoofing. A spoofer counterfeits satellite signals to mislead the receiver to an erring position/time estimation. The tech - nological progress enabling affordable and easy-to-use spoofer hardware further increases the relevance of this threat. To maintain the integrity of the position/ time information, it is mandatory to be able to assess the errors induced by spoofing. The paper at hand derives a bound of the code tracking bias in relevant spoofing scenarios extending the well-known Multipath Error Envelope. These new bounds can be used as a tool to estimate the position/time error, especially but not exclusively for receivers that are collateral damage of a spoofing attack.