Perception of Identity, Perception of Relationship and Strategic Interaction — An Analysis on China–Indian Border Disputes from the Perspective of Game Theories

Abstract

Based on the continuous observation of the ongoing China–India border conflict in recent years, the author intends to answer why China has not yielded prospective policy returns from the Indian side, even if it has been pursuing a cooperative strategy toward India after the Doklam standoff. Inspired by several doctrines of game theory under the dynamic game scenario and the application of relevant gaming tactics, this essay argues that after the Doklam standoff, China has been consistently pursuing an India policy that is risk-averse in nature, represented by its fundamental goal of persevering stability in the secondary direction of China–India border area. As a supporter of this argumentation, a diachronic investigation in terms of the evolution of China–India Relations between 2017 and 2020 was conducted, in which both countries were presumed as state actors involving in repeated gaming process with observable actions and asymmetric information sources. The investigation covers the respective actions adopted by both China and India since the Doklam standoff in 2017, along with the strategic interactions between the two sides from 2018 to 2019, till the most recent standoff in the Galwan Valley and the standoff along the Panggong Tso in 2020. The major finding of this essay is that there exists a causal-effect relationship between the expected payment structures of both sides in a gaming process and the outcome of the implementation of a certain cooperative strategy. Besides, as opponents in a gaming process, either side’s self-cognition and its evaluation on the bilateral relations will pose critical impact on its policy-making. Therefore, in the specific case of China–India border conflict, it is highly advised that China should make practical efforts to avert cognition risks of all kinds while managing its relation with India; otherwise, negative consequences may occur due to the mismatch of its strategic goals and its policy devices.