Managing contract violations in construction projects: a moderated mediating model of enforcement decisions

IF 6.1 3区管理学 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL

Production Planning & Control Pub Date : 2021-06-21 DOI:10.1080/09537287.2021.1951390

H. Yao, Yongqiang Chen, Yurui Zhang, Min Zhang, Yangbing Zhang

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引用次数: 6

Abstract

Abstract Contracts are frequently violated due to opportunism, misunderstandings, or external factors in construction projects. However, most previous studies focussed on how to prevent contract violations but little research has been conducted on responses to contract violations (i.e. enforcement practices) and the factors affecting these responses. Drawing on Attribution Theory, this study constructs a moderated mediating model of enforcement decisions, including contractual enforcement and relational enforcement, from contract violation, to trust and then to enforcement decisions, with the moderating role of legal enforceability. The findings from questionnaires show that compared with spirit violations, letter violations lead to lower trust and, thus, increase the severity of contractual enforcement and relational enforcement. Furthermore, trust exerts a more negative effect on contractual enforcement when legal enforceability is strong. Theoretically, this study provides a deeper understanding of enforcement decisions by incorporating contractual enforcement and relational enforcement, by differentiating types of contract violations, and by considering legal institutions. Practically, overly severe enforcement may lead to disputes and litigation and even endanger the profitable long-term relationship. This study provides guidelines for managers from the violating party to avert overly severe enforcement, and thus avoid high dispute resolution costs and facilitate long-term partnering.

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管理建设项目中的合同违规:执行决策的一个有调节的中介模型

摘要在建设项目中，由于机会主义、误解或外部因素等原因，合同经常被违反。然而，以往的研究大多侧重于如何防止合同违约，而很少研究对合同违约的反应(即执行实践)和影响这些反应的因素。本研究运用归因理论构建了一个执行决策的调节中介模型，包括契约执行和关系执行，从契约违约到信任再到执行决策，其中法律可执行性起着调节作用。问卷调查结果显示，与精神违反相比，信件违反导致信任度降低，从而增加了合同执行和关系执行的严重程度。此外，当法律可执行性较强时，信任对合同执行的负面影响更大。从理论上讲，本研究通过结合合同执行和关系执行、区分合同违约类型以及考虑法律制度，对执行决策提供了更深入的理解。实际上，过于严厉的执行可能导致纠纷和诉讼，甚至危及有利可图的长期关系。本研究为违规方管理人员避免过于严厉的执法提供了指导，从而避免了高昂的争议解决成本，促进了长期合作。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Production Planning & Control 管理科学-工程：工业

CiteScore

19.30

自引率

9.60%

发文量

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

期刊介绍： Production Planning & Control is an international journal that focuses on research papers concerning operations management across industries. It emphasizes research originating from industrial needs that can provide guidance to managers and future researchers. Papers accepted by "Production Planning & Control" should address emerging industrial needs, clearly outlining the nature of the industrial problem. Any suitable research methods may be employed, and each paper should justify the method used. Case studies illustrating international significance are encouraged. Authors are encouraged to relate their work to existing knowledge in the field, particularly regarding its implications for management practice and future research agendas.