The IMF's Imprudent Role As Lender of Last Resort

Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Cato Journal Pub Date : 1998-01-01 DOI:10.7916/D8H4220N
Charles W. Calomiris
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引用次数: 180

Abstract

Throughout history, financial collapses have been defining moments for public policy. Crises promote action, embodied in new financial institutions or policy doctrines. The motives that underlie such policies are sometimes short-sighted--driven by short-run pressures rather than long-run principles--and it is easier to enact unwise policy in the midst of crisis than to reverse course after the crisis has passed, after policies become embodied in institutions or statutes.
国际货币基金组织作为最后贷款人的轻率角色
纵观历史,金融危机一直是公共政策的决定性时刻。危机促使人们采取行动,具体体现在新的金融机构或政策理论上。这些政策背后的动机有时是短视的——受到短期压力而非长期原则的驱动——在危机期间制定不明智的政策,比在危机过去、政策成为制度或法规的具体体现后逆转政策更容易。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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Cato Journal
Cato Journal Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
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