Beyond intentional trust: supplier opportunism and management control mechanisms in public sector procurement and contracting

IF 4.3 2区 管理学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Chris Lonsdale, J. Sanderson, G. Watson, Fei Peng
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引用次数: 10

Abstract

We test an argument, drawn from transaction cost economics, that an assumption of intentional trust should be replaced with one of supplier opportunism in public sector procurement and contract management. We use structural equation modelling to evaluate quantitative evidence from 180 public and private sector buyers on the perceived effectiveness of various management control mechanisms aimed at restraining supplier opportunism. Our findings suggest that supplier opportunism is potentially a problem and that certain procurement and contract management mechanisms can assist buying organisations in moderating that opportunism. This supports arguments in favour of a ‘cautious approach’ to procurement and contract management.
超越故意信任:公共部门采购和合同中的供应商机会主义和管理控制机制
我们检验了一个来自交易成本经济学的论点,即在公共部门采购和合同管理中,故意信任的假设应该被供应商机会主义的假设所取代。我们使用结构方程模型来评估来自180个公共和私营部门买家的量化证据,这些证据表明旨在抑制供应商机会主义的各种管理控制机制的感知有效性。我们的研究结果表明,供应商机会主义是一个潜在的问题,某些采购和合同管理机制可以帮助采购组织缓和这种机会主义。这支持了对采购和合同管理采取“谨慎态度”的论点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.90
自引率
12.80%
发文量
32
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