Drop-Out from Individual Development Accounts: Prediction and Prevention
Mark Schreiner, Michael Sherraden
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引用次数: 39
Abstract
Abstract Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) provide matches for savings by the poor used to build assets. But IDAs cannot help if participants drop out. What predicts drop-out? For IDAs in the American Dream Demonstration, drop-out is less likely if participants already own some assets. In contrast, income and welfare receipt are not linked with drop-out. Drop-out is strongly associated with aspects of IDA design such as match rates, time caps, and the use of automatic transfer. Because drop-out can be predicted, IDA programs can keep costs down while targeting preventative assistance to the most at-risk enrollees. © 2005 Academy of Financial Services. All rights reserved. JEL classifications: C53; 138; G21; O16 1. Introduction Development-i.e., sustained improvement in well being-requires saving to build human, financial, social, and physical capital. Many U.S. policies use tax breaks to subsidize saving, but tax breaks are weak incentives for poor people (Woo, Schweke, & Buchholz, 2004; Seidman, 2001; Howard, 1997; Sherraden, 1991). Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are a new policy instrument designed to help the poor build assets (Sherraden, 1988). Instead of tax breaks, IDAs provide matches for savings used to build human capital (via post-secondary education), physical capital (via home purchase), or business capital (via micro-enterprise). IDAs also build human capital via financial education and social capital via support from program staff. Saving is difficult for anyone, and it is especially difficult for the poor because they already have lower consumption, they have fewer opportunities to increase income, they have fewer existing assets available to shift into IDAs, and they suffer more frequent shocks to income and expenses. Thus, some IDA participants drop-out, saving little or nothing. For example, 48% of the 2,350 participants in the American Dream Demonstration (ADD) "dropped out" with net IDA savings of less than $100. Drop-out is costly all around; IDA programs lose their investment in participants, and participants lose potential matches. Drop-outs may also become discouraged with saving in general. Based on the characteristics of participants and on aspects of IDA design, this paper attempts to predict drop-out and to suggest ways to prevent it. Participants are less likely to drop out if they already have assets, whether human (education or age), financial (checking accounts), physical (homes or cars), or social (marriage). In contrast, participants with debt are more likely to drop out. Unlike assets and debt, income and receipt of welfare are not associated with drop-out. Overall, asset poverty-but not income poverty-is linked with greater risk of drop-out. Aspects of IDA design also predict drop-out. This is useful for prevention; even if policy cannot change participant characteristics, it can change IDA design. In particular, drop-out risk can be reduced by setting higher match rates, helping participants set up automatic transfers to their IDAs, and increasing the number of months eligible to make matchable deposits. This paper first describes IDAs in ADD. It then reports on a Probit regression that predicts drop-out based on participant characteristics and aspects of IDA design. After checking the model's profiling accuracy, the final section presents a summary and discusses implications for saving and asset building in general. 2. IDAs in ADD The American Dream Demonstration (ADD) ran from 1997 to 2003 at 14 IDA programs across the United States. ADD was open to people with household income under 200% of the federal poverty guideline. One-half of participants were below 100% of poverty, and one-fifth was below 50%. Compared to the general low-income population, IDA participants were more disadvantaged in that they were disproportionately female (80%), African American (47%), and/or not married (75%) (Sherraden et al. …
个人发展账户的退出:预测与预防
个人发展账户(IDAs)为穷人用于建立资产的储蓄提供匹配。但是,如果参与者退出,ida也帮不了什么忙。退学的原因是什么?对于“美国梦示范”中的ida来说,如果参与者已经拥有一些资产,那么退出的可能性较小。相比之下,收入和福利收入与辍学无关。退出与IDA设计的各个方面密切相关,例如匹配率、时间上限和自动转移的使用。由于退学是可以预测的,因此IDA项目可以在降低成本的同时,针对风险最大的参保人提供预防性援助。©2005金融服务学会。版权所有。JEL分类:C53;138;G21;O16 1。介绍Development-i.e。例如,福祉的持续改善——需要储蓄来建立人力、金融、社会和物质资本。许多美国政策使用税收减免来补贴储蓄,但税收减免对穷人的激励作用很弱(Woo, Schweke, & Buchholz, 2004;塞德曼,2001;霍华德,1997;Sherraden, 1991)。个人发展账户(IDAs)是一种新的政策工具,旨在帮助穷人建立资产(Sherraden, 1988)。ida不提供税收减免,而是为用于建立人力资本(通过高等教育)、实物资本(通过购房)或商业资本(通过微型企业)的储蓄提供匹配。ida还通过金融教育建立人力资本,通过项目工作人员的支持建立社会资本。储蓄对任何人来说都是困难的,对穷人来说尤其困难,因为他们的消费已经很低了,他们增加收入的机会更少了,他们可转换为ida的现有资产更少了,而且他们的收入和支出更频繁地受到冲击。因此,一些IDA参与者退出,储蓄很少或根本没有。例如,2350名美国梦示范(ADD)参与者中,48%的人“退出”,IDA净节省不到100美元。退学的代价是多方面的;IDA项目失去了对参与者的投资,参与者也失去了潜在的合作伙伴。一般来说,辍学者也可能不愿存钱。根据参与者的特点和IDA设计的各个方面,本文试图预测辍学并提出预防辍学的方法。如果参与者已经拥有资产,无论是人力(教育或年龄)、财务(支票账户)、物质(房屋或汽车)还是社会(婚姻),他们就不太可能退出。相比之下,有债务的参与者更有可能退出。与资产和债务不同,收入和领取福利与辍学无关。总体而言,资产贫困(而非收入贫困)与更大的辍学风险有关。IDA设计的各个方面也预示着辍学。这对预防是有用的;即使政策不能改变参与者的特征,它也可以改变IDA的设计。特别是,可以通过设置更高的匹配率,帮助参与者设置自动转帐到他们的ida,以及增加符合条件进行匹配存款的月数来降低退学风险。本文首先描述了ADD中的IDA。然后报告了基于参与者特征和IDA设计方面预测退出的Probit回归。在检查了模型的分析准确性之后,最后一节给出了一个总结,并讨论了一般的储蓄和资产构建的含义。2. 美国梦示范(ADD)从1997年到2003年在美国的14个IDA项目中进行。ADD对家庭收入低于联邦贫困线200%的人开放。一半的参与者低于100%的贫困,五分之一的人低于50%。与一般低收入人群相比,IDA参与者处于更不利的地位,因为她们不成比例地是女性(80%)、非裔美国人(47%)和/或未婚(75%)(Sherraden et al. . ...)
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