The Value of "New" and "Old" Intermediation in Online Debt Crowdfunding

F. Braggion, A. Manconi, Nicola Pavanini, Haikun Zhu
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

We study the welfare effects of the transition of online debt crowdfunding from the older "peer-to-peer" model to the "marketplace" model, where the crowdfunding platform sells diversified loan portfolios to investor. We develop an equilibrium model of debt crowdfunding capturing platform design (peer-to-peer or marketplace) and lender preferences over loan and portfolio product characteristics, and we estimate it on a novel database on credit at a large online platform based in China. Moving from the peer-to-peer to the marketplace model raises lender surplus, platform profits, and credit provision. At the same time, reducing lender exposure to liquidity risk can be beneficial. A counterfactual scenario where the platform resembles a bank by bearing liquidity risk has similar welfare properties as the marketplace model when liquidity is high, but results in larger lender surplus and credit provision, and only moderately lower platform profits, when liquidity is low.
网络债务众筹中“新”与“旧”中介的价值
本文研究了网络债务众筹从“点对点”模式向“市场”模式转变的福利效应,即众筹平台向投资者出售多样化的贷款组合。我们开发了一个债务众筹平衡模型,捕捉平台设计(点对点或市场)和贷款人对贷款和投资组合产品特征的偏好,并在中国一家大型在线平台的新型信贷数据库上进行了估计。从点对点模式转向市场模式,增加了出借人的盈余、平台的利润和信贷供应。与此同时,减少贷款机构对流动性风险的敞口可能是有益的。当流动性高时,平台类似于银行承担流动性风险的反事实情景具有与市场模型相似的福利属性,但会导致更大的贷款人盈余和信贷供应,而当流动性低时,平台利润只会适度降低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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