M. Goodrich, M. Mitzenmacher, O. Ohrimenko, R. Tamassia
{"title":"Practical oblivious storage","authors":"M. Goodrich, M. Mitzenmacher, O. Ohrimenko, R. Tamassia","doi":"10.1145/2133601.2133604","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study oblivious storage (OS), a natural way to model privacy-preserving data outsourcing where a client, Alice, stores sensitive data at an honest-but-curious server, Bob. We show that Alice can hide both the content of her data and the pattern in which she accesses her data, with high probability, using a method that achieves O(1) amortized rounds of communication between her and Bob for each data access. We assume that Alice and Bob exchange small messages, of size O(N1/c), for some constant c>=2, in a single round, where N is the size of the data set that Alice is storing with Bob. We also assume that Alice has a private memory of size 2N1/c. These assumptions model real-world cloud storage scenarios, where trade-offs occur between latency, bandwidth, and the size of the client's private memory.","PeriodicalId":90472,"journal":{"name":"CODASPY : proceedings of the ... ACM conference on data and application security and privacy. ACM Conference on Data and Application Security & Privacy","volume":"47 3 1","pages":"13-24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"88","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CODASPY : proceedings of the ... ACM conference on data and application security and privacy. ACM Conference on Data and Application Security & Privacy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2133601.2133604","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 88
Abstract
We study oblivious storage (OS), a natural way to model privacy-preserving data outsourcing where a client, Alice, stores sensitive data at an honest-but-curious server, Bob. We show that Alice can hide both the content of her data and the pattern in which she accesses her data, with high probability, using a method that achieves O(1) amortized rounds of communication between her and Bob for each data access. We assume that Alice and Bob exchange small messages, of size O(N1/c), for some constant c>=2, in a single round, where N is the size of the data set that Alice is storing with Bob. We also assume that Alice has a private memory of size 2N1/c. These assumptions model real-world cloud storage scenarios, where trade-offs occur between latency, bandwidth, and the size of the client's private memory.