Changing Federalism and the Islamic Challenge in Tatarstan

Q2 Social Sciences
E. Ponarin
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Tatarstan-an autonomous ethnic republic within the Russian Federation dominated by traditionally Muslim Tatars-was at the forefront of nationalist mobilization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From 1990 to 1993, against a background of political rivalries in Moscow (first between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, then between Yeltsin and the parliament), the republic's leadership enjoyed virtual independence and consolidated its position vis-a-vis the federal government to win extraordinary concessions in a power-sharing treaty between the republic and Russia's central government. The republic's leadership insisted on being an equal partner with Moscow; retained a substantial share of federal taxes for the local budget; and enacted local laws that sometimes contradicted federal law.1 Tatar ethnicity and (especially) proficiency in the Tatar language were essential for advancing in many types of careers in the republic. Until recently, three-quarters of the Tatarstani legislature's (Gossovet) members were ethnic Tatars, even though Tatars barely constituted a majority of the population. During his tenure, however, Russian President Vladimir Putin slowly eroded Tatarstan's independence. Putin rescinded all Tatarstani laws found to contradict federal law and enforced fiscal discipline, and the Moscow headquarters of the ruling United Russia Party demanded its Tatarstani representatives revise the Gossovet's ethnic composition.2Although the Russian federal leadership's reasons for making these changes are clear, their methods of doing so without encountering substantial resistance from the republic's leadership or the Tatarstani nationalist movement's popular leaders are not. I use the example of Tatarstan to examine the ease with which the cental government regained the ground lost to some ethnic republics during the Gorbachev-Yeltsin conflict and Yeltsin's first term as president. Because Tatar nationalism and Islamic tradition were so instrumental to Tatarstan after 1991, I also examine the history of the Volga republic's Islamic renaissance, and the prospects of politicized Islam.Stage One: A Game of NationalismIn the late 1980s, as the Soviet grip on free speech and political organization loosened, nationalistic Tatarstanis mobilized to improve the status of the republic and their native culture. After Russia declared sovereignty on June 12, 1990, Tatarstan sought to elevate its status from an autonomous region within the Russian Federation to a union republic within the Soviet Union. Tatarstan and other autonomous regions, such as Chechnya, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia, profited greatly from Gorbachev and Yeltsin's 1989-91 rivalry. In the context of this power struggle, Yeltsin suggested in 1990 that the leaders of Tatarstan "take as much independence as you can"-warning if they seceded, the "decision will be final."3 However, even after the Soviet Union's collapse and Gorbachev's fall from power, Yeltsin did not focus on reining in autonmous Russian regions, instead wrestling with the parliament over constitutional powers and economic reforms.Meanwhile, before concluding a power-sharing treaty with Moscow on February 15, 1994, Tatarstan enjoyed virtual independence. The republic's government, under the leadership of the experienced Communist bureaucrat Mintimer Shaymiev, artfully employed this independence to consolidate its position vis-a-vis Moscow.4 Within Tatarstan, President Shaymiev played a subtle game with the popular nationalist movement. Although he used the movement as a bargaining chip in his negotiations with Moscow to win more concessions by presenting himself as a nationalist leader, Shaymiev carefully engaged the movement to avoid the same fate as Communist elites in Chechnya, who were ousted by the nationalist movement. 5 Shaymiev proceeded to subdue and marginalize the nationalist movement, securing his grip on political power. At the same time, the republic's status began to resemble that of a union republic within the former Soviet Union. …
变化中的联邦制和鞑靼斯坦的伊斯兰挑战
鞑靼斯坦——俄罗斯联邦内一个由传统的穆斯林鞑靼人统治的自治民族共和国——在20世纪80年代末和90年代初处于民族主义动员的前沿。从1990年到1993年,在莫斯科政治对抗的背景下(先是俄罗斯总统鲍里斯·叶利钦和苏联总统米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫之间,然后是叶利钦和议会之间),共和国领导层享有实质上的独立,并巩固了其相对于联邦政府的地位,在共和国和俄罗斯中央政府之间的权力分享条约中赢得了非同寻常的让步。共和国的领导层坚持与莫斯科成为平等的伙伴;为地方预算保留了相当一部分联邦税收;并制定了有时与联邦法律相抵触的地方法律鞑靼民族和(特别是)精通鞑靼语对于在共和国的许多职业中获得晋升至关重要。直到最近,鞑靼立法机构(Gossovet)成员中有四分之三是鞑靼人,尽管鞑靼人勉强占人口的多数。然而,在他的任期内,俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京慢慢侵蚀了鞑靼斯坦的独立性。普京废除了所有与联邦法律和财政纪律相抵触的鞑靼斯坦法律,执政的统一俄罗斯党的莫斯科总部要求其鞑靼斯坦代表修改苏联的民族构成。虽然俄罗斯联邦领导层做出这些改变的原因很清楚,但他们在不遭遇共和国领导层或鞑靼斯坦民族主义运动民众领导人实质性抵制的情况下这样做的方法却不清楚。我以鞑靼斯坦为例,考察了中央政府在戈尔巴乔夫-叶利钦冲突和叶利钦第一个总统任期期间,是如何轻而易举地收复了一些少数民族共和国的失地。由于鞑靼民族主义和伊斯兰传统在1991年后对鞑靼斯坦起到了重要作用,我也研究了伏尔加共和国伊斯兰复兴的历史,以及政治化伊斯兰教的前景。第一阶段:民族主义的游戏20世纪80年代末,随着苏联对言论自由和政治组织的控制松动,鞑靼斯坦民族主义者动员起来改善共和国的地位和他们的本土文化。在俄罗斯于1990年6月12日宣布主权后,鞑靼斯坦试图将其地位从俄罗斯联邦的一个自治区提升到苏联的一个加盟共和国。鞑靼斯坦和其他自治区,如车臣、巴什科尔托斯坦和雅库特,从戈尔巴乔夫和叶利钦1989-91年的竞争中受益匪浅。在这种权力斗争的背景下,叶利钦在1990年建议鞑靼斯坦的领导人“尽可能地独立”,并警告说,如果他们脱离,“决定将是最终的”。然而,即使在苏联解体和戈尔巴乔夫下台之后,叶利钦也没有把重点放在控制俄罗斯的自治地区上,而是在宪法权力和经济改革上与议会角力。与此同时,在1994年2月15日与莫斯科签订权力分享条约之前,鞑靼斯坦实际上享有独立。在经验丰富的共产主义官僚Mintimer Shaymiev的领导下,共和国政府巧妙地利用这种独立性来巩固其相对于莫斯科的地位。在鞑靼斯坦内部,总统Shaymiev与流行的民族主义运动玩了一个微妙的游戏。尽管在与莫斯科的谈判中,沙米耶夫把这场运动作为筹码,以民族主义领袖的姿态来赢得更多让步,但他小心翼翼地参与了这场运动,以避免与车臣的共产主义精英一样的命运,后者被民族主义运动驱逐。沙米耶夫继续镇压和边缘化民族主义运动,巩固了他对政治权力的控制。与此同时,共和国的地位开始类似于前苏联的加盟共和国。…
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来源期刊
Demokratizatsiya
Demokratizatsiya Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Occupying a unique niche among literary journals, ANQ is filled with short, incisive research-based articles about the literature of the English-speaking world and the language of literature. Contributors unravel obscure allusions, explain sources and analogues, and supply variant manuscript readings. Also included are Old English word studies, textual emendations, and rare correspondence from neglected archives. The journal is an essential source for professors and students, as well as archivists, bibliographers, biographers, editors, lexicographers, and textual scholars. With subjects from Chaucer and Milton to Fitzgerald and Welty, ANQ delves into the heart of literature.
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