{"title":"Decentralized Environmental Regulation with Agglomeration Forces","authors":"Mitch Kunce","doi":"10.47260/bej/1112","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract\n\nConvention, in the setting of interjurisdictional economic competition, envisions a race-to-the-bottom when decentralized jurisdictions, in their eagerness to attract commerce, introduce policies to reduce business costs in the form of tax structures that under-provide local public goods and lax pollution standards that lower environmental quality. The current body of empirical evidence, however, does not provide compelling support for the race within the context of environmental federalism. The theoretical work presented herein debits the inventory of literature questioning the race-to-the-bottom claim by introducing agglomeration forces into the standard model. When agglomeration influences are weak to moderate, the race is still on. Conversely, when agglomeration forces are strong, fiscal competition influences are mitigated therefore providing jurisdiction's incentives to strengthen local environmental standards.\n\nJEL classification numbers: H73, R12, R30.\nKeywords: Environmental federalism, Interjurisdictional competition, External economies of scale.","PeriodicalId":48210,"journal":{"name":"International Small Business Journal-Researching Entrepreneurship","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Small Business Journal-Researching Entrepreneurship","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.47260/bej/1112","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Business, Management and Accounting","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract
Convention, in the setting of interjurisdictional economic competition, envisions a race-to-the-bottom when decentralized jurisdictions, in their eagerness to attract commerce, introduce policies to reduce business costs in the form of tax structures that under-provide local public goods and lax pollution standards that lower environmental quality. The current body of empirical evidence, however, does not provide compelling support for the race within the context of environmental federalism. The theoretical work presented herein debits the inventory of literature questioning the race-to-the-bottom claim by introducing agglomeration forces into the standard model. When agglomeration influences are weak to moderate, the race is still on. Conversely, when agglomeration forces are strong, fiscal competition influences are mitigated therefore providing jurisdiction's incentives to strengthen local environmental standards.
JEL classification numbers: H73, R12, R30.
Keywords: Environmental federalism, Interjurisdictional competition, External economies of scale.
期刊介绍:
The International Small Business Journal (ISBJ) is a leading peer-reviewed journal renowned for publishing high-quality original research papers on small business and entrepreneurship. It prioritizes research-based studies that contribute to theory development, critical understanding, and policy formulation related to small firms.
ISBJ papers encompass theoretical, methodological, and empirical studies from various disciplines and perspectives, aiming for research excellence in the field. The journal provides a critical forum for world-class contributions analyzing entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial behavior.
This refereed journal is valuable to academics, policymakers, analysts, government and business officials, small business representative bodies, and support agencies seeking to gain insights into the sector, trade, business institutions, and related matters.