Two Sided Internet Markets and the Need to Assess Both Upstream and Downstream Impacts

R. Frieden
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

This paper will explain how many information, communications and entertainment (“ICE”) markets support companies serving both downstream consumers, but also upstream ventures that access consumers primarily through an intermediary. Operating in a double-sided marketplace, intermediaries can achieve fast growth as they serve diverse geographical markets without having to erect or lease the telecommunications and information processing infrastructure needed to switch, route and deliver content to end users. ICE intermediaries also can expand quickly by accruing positive networking externalities as consumer welfare and incentives to subscribe increase. ICE platform operators have thrived in a largely deregulated marketplace with prospective regulation largely preempted by the view that consumers have benefitted without the need for government oversight. However, the court of public opinion may have begun to deviate from the view that platform operators present a universally positive value proposition. A proper assessment of consumer welfare balances downstream enhancements through convenience, cost savings, free-rider opportunities and innovation with upstream costs including the value of uncompensated consumer data collection, the viability and competitiveness of ICE ventures, e.g., newspapers, as well as the earnings, employability and stability of employees operating within the “gig economy.” The paper determines that many of the platform intermediaries most likely to harm consumers and competition have benefitted by a reluctance of government agencies to examine upstream impacts. Such reticence stems from legitimate concerns about over-reach, mission creep and jurisdiction. It also may represent prudent concerns that government not interfere and handicap successful ventures simply because their marketplace victories also trigger defeats. An emphasis on consumer impact steers agencies and reviewing courts toward a downstream emphasis, because consumers reside on that side of the double-sided market. On the other hand, the paper asserts that upside market assessments will become essential for a complete and statutory-compliant evidentiary record and thorough analysis. The paper will examine United States v. American Express Company, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016)(appeal pending), where an appellate court assessed both sides of a credit card issuer platform to determine the combined effects on consumers when an issuer tried to impose a contractual prohibition on merchants “steering” consumers to an alternative credit card offering lower processing fees to merchants. The lower court rejected the language as potentially raising consumer costs, without considering whether such terms might actually facilitate consumer benefits such as financial rebates. The paper concludes that double-sided markets require assessments of potential competitive and consumer harm occurring on both sides.
双边互联网市场和评估上下游影响的必要性
本文将解释有多少信息、通信和娱乐(“ICE”)市场既支持服务下游消费者的公司,也支持主要通过中介接触消费者的上游企业。在一个双边市场中运作,中介机构可以实现快速增长,因为它们服务于不同的地理市场,而不必建立或租赁电信和信息处理基础设施,以切换、路由和向最终用户交付内容。随着消费者福利和订阅激励的增加,ICE中介机构也可以通过积累积极的网络外部性来迅速扩张。ICE平台运营商在一个基本上放松管制的市场中蓬勃发展,由于消费者在不需要政府监督的情况下受益,预期的监管在很大程度上被先发制人。然而,舆论法庭可能已经开始偏离平台运营商提出普遍积极的价值主张的观点。对消费者福利的适当评估平衡了通过便利、成本节约、搭便车机会和创新来提高下游效益的上游成本,包括无偿收集消费者数据的价值、ICE企业(如报纸)的可行性和竞争力,以及在“零工经济”中运营的员工的收入、就业能力和稳定性。该论文认为,由于政府机构不愿审查上游影响,许多最有可能损害消费者和竞争的平台中介机构从中受益。这种沉默源于对越权、任务蔓延和管辖权的合理担忧。这也可能代表着谨慎的担忧,即政府不能仅仅因为成功的企业在市场上的胜利也会引发失败,就对其进行干预和阻碍。对消费者影响的强调引导了机构和审查法院对下游的强调,因为消费者居住在双面市场的那一边。另一方面,本文断言,上行市场评估将成为一个完整的、符合法律规定的证据记录和彻底分析的必要条件。本文将审查美国诉美国运通公司案,838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016)(上诉待审),其中上诉法院评估了信用卡发卡机构平台的双方,以确定当发卡机构试图对商家“引导”消费者使用向商家提供较低手续费的替代信用卡施加合同禁止时,对消费者的综合影响。下级法院驳回了这一措辞,因为它可能会提高消费者的成本,而没有考虑这些条款是否实际上会促进消费者的利益,比如金融回扣。本文的结论是,双边市场需要对双方发生的潜在竞争和消费者损害进行评估。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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