The ‘conceit of controllability’: nuclear diplomacy, Japan’s plutonium reprocessing ambitions and US proliferation fears, 1974-1978

Abstract

ABSTRACT US-Japanese nuclear diplomacy on plutonium reprocessing was a means by which both attempted to assert control. For Japan, this meant control over its energy supplies and the status associated with advanced nuclear power technology. Japan had emerged as an economic giant but had accepted a diminution in status by adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and was determined not to have its access to cutting edge nuclear power technology curtailed. The US sought to control the spread of a technology which would produce plutonium and consequently, it was feared, increase the chances of weapons proliferation. Washington’s diplomatic gambit, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, attempted to use ‘neutral’ science for political ends. However, Tokyo was able to ally with partners to frustrate Washington’s ambitions. In the long-term Japan did not score a victory since the hopes of reprocessing were not realized. Ultimately, neither was able to assert control.