Activation games in online dating platforms

Abstract

In this paper we describe a model for the activation level of users in online dating platforms (ODPs). Such popular systems are conceived in order to match individuals from two groups of potential mates. The business of such platforms pivots around the customers' expectancy to get in contact with their future dates: upon the payment of a fee to the platform owner, ODPs provide specific tools to improve reach and visibility.However, ODPs require a critical number of active users in order to sustain their operations (and their business). Customers of the platform trade off on the price for being more visible and attract mates' contacts. A user becomes inactive if he or she is not contacted by others for some time: being contacted by potential mates acts as an activation signal. The aim of our analysis is to propose a game theoretical framework to capture such a complex activation problem in strategic form. We unveil the structure of Nash equilibria and we further derive a Stackelberg formulation. The latter is a hierarchical game where the platform owner aims at maximizing profits while preserving the ODP activity level above a critical epidemic threshold.