Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions

Hillary A. Sale, R. Thompson
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Securities class actions play a crucial, if contested, role in the policing of securities fraud and the protection of securities markets. The theoretical understanding of these private enforcement claims needs to evolve to encompass the broader set of goals that underlie the securities regulatory impulse and the publicness of those goals. Further, a clear grasp of the modern securities class action also requires an updated understanding of how the role of market intermediation in securities transactions has reshaped the realities of securities litigation in public companies and the evolution of the fraud cause of action in the context of open-market transactions. The Supreme Court’s embrace of market efficiency as a mechanism to establish reliance in its 1988 decision, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, illustrates the necessary adaptation of common law fraud to the modern market setting, and Congressional enactment of the PSLRA in 1995 exemplifies the efforts to respond to the litigation risks inherent in that adaptation. Together, Basic and the PSLRA provide a frame for understanding both a series of recent Supreme Court decisions on securities class actions and a different understanding of the theory undergirding those class actions. To develop this understanding, we expand the conversation about the goals of securities regulation to include the set of goals that are rooted in publicness and focus on market protection, innovation, and growth, as well as stability and systemic considerations. We posit that this broader theoretical understanding explains why the Court rejected a challenge to the fraud on the market doctrine and, instead, permitted the continued use of market efficiency: the Court chose to preserve the deterrence and enforcement role of these cases in promoting market growth and innovation. We then apply this understanding of publicness and market intermediation to the interpretation of the Court’s limited, but ambiguous, use of “price impact” in securities fraud cases. Our analysis reveals that the practical balance established by Basic and the PSLRA has prevailed over pure doctrinal approaches to issues like reliance or other, more incomplete theoretical explanations focused solely on compensation, deterrence, and investor protection, but neglecting the role of publicness in the securities markets.
市场中介、公开性和证券集体诉讼
证券集体诉讼在监管证券欺诈和保护证券市场方面发挥着至关重要的作用。对这些私人执法要求的理论理解需要发展,以涵盖构成证券监管冲动和这些目标的公开性的更广泛的目标。此外,要清楚地掌握现代证券集体诉讼,还需要对市场中介在证券交易中的作用如何重塑上市公司证券诉讼的现实以及公开市场交易背景下欺诈诉因的演变有一个最新的理解。最高法院在1988年的判决“Basic, Inc. v. Levinson”中将市场效率作为建立信赖的一种机制,这说明了普通法欺诈必须适应现代市场环境,1995年国会颁布的PSLRA体现了应对这种适应所固有的诉讼风险的努力。总之,Basic和PSLRA提供了一个框架来理解最近一系列最高法院关于证券集体诉讼的判决,以及对这些集体诉讼的理论的不同理解。为了发展这种理解,我们扩大了关于证券监管目标的对话,包括植根于公开的一系列目标,重点是市场保护、创新和增长,以及稳定性和系统性考虑。我们认为,这种更广泛的理论理解解释了为什么法院驳回了对市场欺诈理论的挑战,相反,允许继续使用市场效率:法院选择保留这些案件在促进市场增长和创新方面的威慑和执法作用。然后,我们将这种对公开性和市场中介的理解应用于法院在证券欺诈案件中有限但模棱两可地使用“价格影响”的解释。我们的分析表明,《基本原则》和《PSLRA》所建立的实际平衡,在处理依赖或其他更不完整的理论解释等问题时,已经胜过了纯粹的理论方法,这些理论解释只关注补偿、威慑和投资者保护,而忽视了公开在证券市场中的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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