At a Dead End: Russian Policy and the Russian Far East

Q2 Social Sciences
Stephen J. Blank
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Contemporary Russian foreign policy is aggressive, belligerent, offensive, and swaggering. Official statements reflect the now-popular elite view that Russia is up, America is down, and Europe counts for little or nothing because of its disarray. Russia's statesmen and analysts are also prone to this tendency to make inflated claims of Russia as an Asian power. For example, in 2008, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that because Russian consumers are buying more Japanese cars, many of which are made in (European) Russia, Russia "makes for the prosperity of Asia, and in particular, Japan with its entire potential." Lavrov also stated that the plan to hold the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Vladivostok in 2012 and Russia's growing involvement in Asian economic and political processes proves that "Russia's integration into the [Asia-Pacific Region] has become a fait accompli."1 Similarly, the veteran foreign policy analyst Viktor Kremenyuk writes that the revival of Russian power is making it an increasingly serious competitor to the United States. He charges that Russia is "successfully crowding out the United States from its position as China's No. 1 partner, and over time could become that country's quasi-ally."2It would be difficult to account for such grandiose delusions without understanding Russian elites' long-standing habit of making inflated claims about Russia to compensate for or conceal the weakness and disarray that they often perceive at home. However, when we examine Russian policy in Asia, and particularly the state of its far eastern provinces, whose effective development is essential for success in Asia, Moscow's tone changes. This may well reflect the differing audiences involved: in statements concerning Russian policy in Asia, Moscow and Russian elites are speaking to the local and central government elites directly responsible for making and implementing policy, whereas the aforementioned belligerent statements are targeted at different audiences; the swaggering tone is aimed to induce recognition of Russia's strength and power. This tone is intended for an audience of foreign elites that Russia wants to influence and the domestic public, whom the government wants to convince of its stalwart defense of Russia's great-power status. In this respect, statements about Russian foreign policy seek to convince audiences at home (both elite and popular) and abroad that Russia really is the great global power that its leaders want and imagine it to be. Thus, rhetoric about Russian foreign policy in Europe and Asia is very much an identity project.3However, in the Russian Far East (RFE), the reality continues to fall short of the ideal, and Russian authorities therefore feel compelled to admit the gap between the real and desired outcomes and to frighten domestic audiences for the purpose of energizing them in pursuit of that great-power status. For that reason, policy-relevant remarks that are directed more toward the elite domestic audiences who must implement policy contain a quite open anxiety, a sense of frustration, sometimes even a sense of being lost, and mounting apprehension about the future course of events. Russian authorities have been apprehensive about their Far East policy since 2000, if not earlier. Their apprehension reflects Moscow's continuing realization that Russia is failing to develop the RFE as it has long intended to do and its attempt to galvanize local elites by any available means to develop the RFE work.For example, in 2000, President Vladimir Putin warned local audiences that unless Russia put more effort into the region's development, they would end up speaking Korean, Japanese, or Chinese. Putin's warning left little doubt about Russian fears regarding its Asiatic holdings and which foreign powers might step in should Russia falter.4 In 2002, the prestigious Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) admonished its elite audience that Siberia and the RFE would inevitably be depopulated. …
死胡同:俄罗斯政策与俄罗斯远东地区
当代俄罗斯的外交政策是咄咄逼人、好战、咄咄逼人、趾高气扬的。官方声明反映了现在流行的精英观点,即俄罗斯在上升,美国在下降,欧洲由于混乱而无足轻重。俄罗斯的政治家和分析人士也倾向于夸大俄罗斯作为亚洲大国的地位。例如,2008年,俄罗斯外交部长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫(Sergey Lavrov)声称,由于俄罗斯消费者正在购买更多的日本汽车,其中许多汽车是在(欧洲)俄罗斯制造的,俄罗斯“以其全部潜力促进了亚洲,特别是日本的繁荣”。拉夫罗夫还表示,计划于2012年在符拉迪沃斯托克举行年度亚太经合组织(APEC)会议,以及俄罗斯越来越多地参与亚洲经济和政治进程,证明“俄罗斯融入(亚太地区)已经成为既成事实”。同样,资深外交政策分析人士维克多·克雷门约克(Viktor Kremenyuk)写道,俄罗斯实力的复兴正使其日益成为美国的有力竞争对手。他指责俄罗斯“成功地把美国从中国头号伙伴的位置上挤出来,随着时间的推移,俄罗斯可能会成为中国的准盟友。”如果不理解俄罗斯精英们长期以来的习惯,即对俄罗斯做出夸大的断言,以弥补或掩盖他们经常在国内看到的软弱和混乱,就很难解释这种浮夸的妄想。然而,当我们审视俄罗斯在亚洲的政策,尤其是远东省份的状况(这些省份的有效发展对在亚洲取得成功至关重要)时,莫斯科的语气发生了变化。这可能很好地反映了所涉及的不同受众:在有关俄罗斯亚洲政策的声明中,莫斯科和俄罗斯精英是对直接负责制定和实施政策的地方和中央政府精英说话,而上述好战言论针对的是不同的受众;这种傲慢的语气旨在让人们认识到俄罗斯的实力。这种语气针对的是俄罗斯想要影响的外国精英听众,以及俄罗斯政府想要说服的俄罗斯坚定捍卫大国地位的国内公众。在这方面,关于俄罗斯外交政策的声明试图说服国内(包括精英和大众)和国外的受众,俄罗斯确实是其领导人想要和想象的全球大国。因此,有关俄罗斯在欧洲和亚洲的外交政策的言论在很大程度上是一个身份认同项目。然而,在俄罗斯远东地区(RFE),现实与理想仍然相去甚远,俄罗斯当局因此感到不得不承认实际结果与期望结果之间的差距,并吓唬国内民众,以激励他们追求大国地位。因此,与政策相关的言论更多地针对必须执行政策的国内精英受众,其中包含了一种相当公开的焦虑、挫败感,有时甚至是迷失感,以及对未来事态发展的日益担忧。俄罗斯当局自2000年(如果不是更早的话)就对其远东政策感到担忧。他们的担忧反映出莫斯科持续意识到,俄罗斯未能像其长期以来所打算的那样发展远东地区,并试图通过任何可用的手段激励当地精英发展远东地区的工作。例如,2000年,俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)警告当地民众,除非俄罗斯为该地区的发展付出更多努力,否则他们最终会说韩语、日语或中文。普京的警告毫无疑问地表明,俄罗斯担心其在亚洲的资产,以及一旦俄罗斯动摇,哪些外国势力可能会介入2002年,享有盛誉的外交与国防政策委员会(SVOP)告诫其精英听众,西伯利亚和远东地区人口将不可避免地减少。…
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来源期刊
Demokratizatsiya
Demokratizatsiya Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Occupying a unique niche among literary journals, ANQ is filled with short, incisive research-based articles about the literature of the English-speaking world and the language of literature. Contributors unravel obscure allusions, explain sources and analogues, and supply variant manuscript readings. Also included are Old English word studies, textual emendations, and rare correspondence from neglected archives. The journal is an essential source for professors and students, as well as archivists, bibliographers, biographers, editors, lexicographers, and textual scholars. With subjects from Chaucer and Milton to Fitzgerald and Welty, ANQ delves into the heart of literature.
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