How Do You Qualify as a Whistleblower Under The Dodd-Frank Act? Blowing the Whistle on a Circuit Split

Q2 Social Sciences
Hugo S. W. Farmer
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Abstract

            Recently, a circuit split has arisen with regard to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The circuit split concerns the question of what it takes for an individual to qualify as a “whistleblower” under the terms of the statute. This circuit split is surprising, as the Dodd- Frank Act purports to answer this question itself by providing a definition of this term, a definition which the Fifth Circuit has treated as being conclusive. Nonetheless, the Second and the Ninth Circuits have held that with respect to some, but not all, of the Dodd-Frank Act, this statutory “whistleblower” definition does not apply. Shortly, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve the matter when it hears an appeal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust Inc. This article provides three broad reasons why the Supreme Court should reject the Second and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations. First, the interpretation endorsed by the Second and Ninth Circuits is the result of a flawed exercise in statutory interpretation that incorrectly applies principles recently set down by the Supreme Court in King v. Burwell, and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA. Secondly, while the Second and Ninth Circuits rejected the Fifth Circuits’ interpretation on the basis that it withholds the protection of the Dodd-Frank Act from auditors and attorneys, the Second and Ninth Circuits’ preferred interpretations also fail to protect auditors and attorneys. Finally, the policy reasons in favor of extending the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower protections to auditors and attorneys are insufficiently strong to warrant departing from the natural meaning of the statutory language at issue.   
根据多德-弗兰克法案,你如何符合举报人的资格?吹口哨在电路分裂
最近,围绕《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革与消费者保护法案》(Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act)出现了巡回辩论。巡回法院的意见分歧涉及的问题是,根据该法规的规定,个人需要具备什么条件才能成为“举报人”。这种巡回法院的分歧令人惊讶,因为《多德-弗兰克法案》试图通过提供这个术语的定义来回答这个问题,这个定义被第五巡回法院视为结论性的。然而,第二巡回法院和第九巡回法院认为,对于多德-弗兰克法案的部分内容,而不是全部内容,法定的“举报人”定义并不适用。不久,最高法院将有机会在听取第九巡回法院对萨默斯诉数字房地产信托公司一案判决的上诉时解决这个问题。本文提供了最高法院应该拒绝第二和第九巡回法院解释的三个广泛理由。首先,第二和第九巡回法院支持的解释是在法律解释中错误运用的结果,错误地应用了最高法院最近在金诉伯韦尔案和公用事业空气监管集团诉环保署案中确立的原则。其次,虽然第二和第九巡回法院驳回了第五巡回法院的解释,理由是它拒绝了《多德-弗兰克法案》对审计师和律师的保护,但第二和第九巡回法院的首选解释也未能保护审计师和律师。最后,支持将《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)对举报人的保护扩大到审计师和律师的政策理由,不足以让人有理由偏离相关法定语言的自然含义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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