When Ideas Conspire with Circumstances: Introducing Individual Transferable Quotas in Fisheries

Abstract

Deux ques t ions impor tantes sont rarement posees a propos de lintroduction possible de Quotas Individuels Transferables (QIT) dans les pecheries : Pourquoi ny a-t-il que deux pays dans le monde, lIslande et la Nouvelle Zelande, qui ont introduit un systeme comprehensible de QIT dans leurs pecheries ? et : qui soccupe de la privatisation des biens dacces libre ? Lexperience de lIslande peut donner quelques reponses. Dans une premiere partie, levolution du systeme de QIT en Islande entre 1975 et 2000 est decrite comme un processus difficile de marchandage. Dune part les couts de marchandage furent abaisses par la crainte repandue de la disparition des stocks de poisson, et par la relative homogeneite dans les pecheries pelagiques. Dautre part ces couts furent augmentes, par lheterogeneite dans les pecheries demersales, avec des differences immenses entre les proprietaires de petits bateaux et ceux de grands chalutiers, ainsi que des differences entre les regions. Dans la seconde partie, est decrite la nature du systeme de QIT: alors que ceux qui detiennent des QIT jouissent de droits dextraction plutot que de la propriete, lintroduction du systeme de QIT equivaut a cloturer partiellement les stocks de poisson dans les eaux dIslande, resolvant ainsi la plupart des problemes associes a la tragedie des communs. Le systeme a plutot bien opere mis a part quelques problemes subsistants, en particulier le statut legal incertain des QIT et les prises de premier choix. La troisieme partie decrit les controverses actuelles au sujet du systeme des QIT. Nous demontrons que le seul moyen de rendre lintroduction de ce systeme acceptable pour les proprietaires dun capital de peche etait dallouer des quotas sur la base de lhistoire des prises, et quune taxe speciale sur la location des ressources serait injuste car elle frapperait ceux qui ont choisi de rester dans les pecheries et non ceux qui ont ete mis a lecart.Two important questions are rarely asked about the possible introduction of ITQs in fisheries: Why are there only two countries in the world, Iceland and New Zealand, which have introduced a comprehensive ITQ system into their fisheries? and: Who cares whether the commons is privatized? The experience in Iceland may provide some answers. In Part 1, the evolution of the ITQ system in Iceland in 1975-2000 is described as a difficult process of bargaining. Costs of bargaining were lowered by the widespread fear of the collapse of the fish stocks, and by the relative homogeneity in the pelagic fisheries. Those costs were increased, on the other hand, by the heterogeneity in the demersal fisheries, with vast differences between owners of small boats and large trawlers, and also between regions. In Part II, the nature of the ITQ system is described: while those who hold ITQs enjoy rights of extraction rather than property, the introduction of the ITQ system amounts to the partial enclosure of the fish stocks in Icelandic waters, solving most of the problems associated with the tragedy of the commons. The system has performed quite well although some problems remain, in particular the uncertain legal status of the ITQs and high-grading. In Part III, current controversies about the ITQ system are described. It is argued that the only way to make the introduction of the system acceptable to owners of fishing capital was to allocate quotas on the basis of catch history, and that a special resource rent tax would be unjust, since it would hit those who chose to remain in the fisheries, not those who were bought out.