MIND

Q3 Computer Science
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引用次数: 48

Abstract

To begin with the psychologists have not yet made it clear what Mind is. I do not mean its substratum; but they have not even made it clear what a psychical phenomenon is. Far less has any notion of mind been established and generally acknowledged which can compare for an instant in distinctness to the dynamical conception of matter. Almost all the psychologists still tell us that mind is consciousness. But to my apprehension Hartmann has proved conclusively that unconscious mind exists. What is meant by consciousness is really in itself nothing but feeling. Gay and Hartley were quite right about that; and though there may be, and probably is, something of the general nature of feeling almost everywhere, yet feeling in any ascertainable degree is a mere property of protoplasm, perhaps only of nerve matter. Now it so happens that biological organisms, and especially a nervous system are favorably conditioned for exhibiting the phenomena of mind also; and therefore it is not surprising that mind and feeling should be confounded. But I do not believe that psychology can be set to rights until the importance of Hartmann’s argument is acknowledged, and it is seen that feeling is nothing but the inward aspect of things, while mind on the contrary is essentially an external phenomenon. The error is very much like that which was so long prevalent that an electrical current moved through the metallic wire; while it is now known that that is just the only place from which it is cut off, being wholly external to the wire. Again, the psychologists undertake to locate various mental powers in the brain; and above all consider it as quite certain that the faculty of language resides in a certain lobe; but I believe it comes decidedly nearer the truth (though not really true) that language resides in the tongue. In my opinion it is much more true that the thoughts of a living writer are in any printed copy of his book than that they are in his brain.
首先,心理学家还没有弄清楚什么是心灵。我指的不是它的底层;但他们甚至没有弄清楚什么是心理现象。关于精神的任何概念,只要能在顷刻间的清晰性上与物质的动力学概念相比较,就已经建立起来并得到普遍承认了。几乎所有的心理学家仍然告诉我们,心灵就是意识。但据我所知,哈特曼已经确凿地证明了潜意识的存在。所谓意识,其实本身不过是感觉而已。盖伊和哈特利在这一点上说得很对;虽然几乎在任何地方都可能存在,而且很可能确实存在某种感觉的一般性质,然而,在任何可确定的程度上,感觉仅仅是原生质的一种特性,也许只是神经物质的一种特性。生物有机体,尤其是神经系统恰好也具备表现心理现象的有利条件;因此,精神和感情被混淆也就不足为奇了。但是,我不相信心理学可以被纠正,除非承认哈特曼的论点的重要性,并且看到感觉只不过是事物的内在方面,而相反,精神本质上是一种外部现象。这种误差很像长期以来普遍存在的误差,电流通过金属导线;但现在我们知道,这只是它完全在电线外面被切断的唯一地方。再一次,心理学家承诺在大脑中定位各种精神力量;最重要的是,可以肯定的是,语言的能力存在于某个脑叶中;但我相信,语言存在于舌头中,这显然更接近真理(尽管并非完全正确)。在我看来,一个活着的作家的思想存在于他的书的任何印刷版本中,而不是存在于他的大脑中,这一点更为真实。
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来源期刊
Operating Systems Review (ACM)
Operating Systems Review (ACM) Computer Science-Computer Networks and Communications
CiteScore
2.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
期刊介绍: Operating Systems Review (OSR) is a publication of the ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems (SIGOPS), whose scope of interest includes: computer operating systems and architecture for multiprogramming, multiprocessing, and time sharing; resource management; evaluation and simulation; reliability, integrity, and security of data; communications among computing processors; and computer system modeling and analysis.
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