Shlomo Pines on Maimonides, Spinoza, and Kant

IF 0.2 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
W. Harvey
{"title":"Shlomo Pines on Maimonides, Spinoza, and Kant","authors":"W. Harvey","doi":"10.1163/1477285X-12341237","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his “Spinoza’s TTP, Maimonides, and Kant” (1968), Pines compared Spinoza’s dogmas of universal faith (TTP, 14) with Kant’s postulates of practical reason (Critique of Practical Reason, part 1). According to him, Spinoza’s dogmas, like Maimonides’ “necessary beliefs” (Guide 3:28), are postulates necessary for political welfare, and do not fall under the jurisdiction of theoretical reason. They define the faith of the common person, not that of the philosopher. Kant, in his remarks about Spinoza as an “upright skeptic,” mistakenly thought his dogmas were true beliefs, not necessary ones; and his notion of postulates of practical reason seems to have been in part influenced by his mistaken view of Spinoza’s dogmas. The transformation of Maimonides’ “necessary beliefs” into Kant’s “postulates of practical reason,” as narrated by Pines, recalls the similar transformation of “Averroism” into “Christian Averroism” in the thirteenth century. In essays written from the late 1970s until his death in 1990, Pines returned to the theme of Maimonides and Kant, and argued convincingly that Maimonides’ epistemology was “critical” in the Kantian sense. However, his related argument that Maimonides’ religious sensibility was similar to Kant’s is less convincing. Unlike Kant, Maimonides did not think that critical epistemology made room for faith, but held that it caused one to tremble in awe. Like Spinoza, he identified true faith with intellectual knowledge, not something beyond it. His distinctiveness as a philosopher is that he was a God-intoxicated Knower like Spinoza, but a critical epistemologist like Kant.","PeriodicalId":42022,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF JEWISH THOUGHT & PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2019-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF JEWISH THOUGHT & PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/1477285X-12341237","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract In his “Spinoza’s TTP, Maimonides, and Kant” (1968), Pines compared Spinoza’s dogmas of universal faith (TTP, 14) with Kant’s postulates of practical reason (Critique of Practical Reason, part 1). According to him, Spinoza’s dogmas, like Maimonides’ “necessary beliefs” (Guide 3:28), are postulates necessary for political welfare, and do not fall under the jurisdiction of theoretical reason. They define the faith of the common person, not that of the philosopher. Kant, in his remarks about Spinoza as an “upright skeptic,” mistakenly thought his dogmas were true beliefs, not necessary ones; and his notion of postulates of practical reason seems to have been in part influenced by his mistaken view of Spinoza’s dogmas. The transformation of Maimonides’ “necessary beliefs” into Kant’s “postulates of practical reason,” as narrated by Pines, recalls the similar transformation of “Averroism” into “Christian Averroism” in the thirteenth century. In essays written from the late 1970s until his death in 1990, Pines returned to the theme of Maimonides and Kant, and argued convincingly that Maimonides’ epistemology was “critical” in the Kantian sense. However, his related argument that Maimonides’ religious sensibility was similar to Kant’s is less convincing. Unlike Kant, Maimonides did not think that critical epistemology made room for faith, but held that it caused one to tremble in awe. Like Spinoza, he identified true faith with intellectual knowledge, not something beyond it. His distinctiveness as a philosopher is that he was a God-intoxicated Knower like Spinoza, but a critical epistemologist like Kant.
论迈蒙尼德、斯宾诺莎和康德
在他的《斯宾诺莎的TTP,迈蒙尼德和康德》(1968)中,派恩斯将斯宾诺莎的普遍信仰教条(TTP, 14)与康德的实践理性假设(《实践理性批判》,第1部分)进行了比较。在他看来,斯宾诺莎的教条,就像迈蒙尼德的“必要信仰”(指南3:28)一样,是政治福利所必需的假设,不属于理论理性的管辖范围。它们定义了普通人的信仰,而不是哲学家的信仰。康德在评论斯宾诺莎是一个“正直的怀疑论者”时,错误地认为他的教条是真正的信仰,而不是必要的;他关于实践理性的假设的观念似乎部分地受到他对斯宾诺莎教条的错误看法的影响。迈蒙尼德的“必要信念”转变为康德的“实践理性假设”,正如派恩斯所叙述的那样,让人想起了13世纪“阿威罗伊主义”向“基督教阿威罗伊主义”的类似转变。从20世纪70年代末到1990年去世,派恩斯在他的文章中回到了迈蒙尼德和康德的主题,并令人信服地论证了迈蒙尼德的认识论在康德的意义上是“批判的”。然而,他的相关论点,迈蒙尼德的宗教感性类似于康德的,是不太令人信服。与康德不同,迈蒙尼德不认为批判认识论为信仰创造了空间,而是认为它使人敬畏地颤抖。像斯宾诺莎一样,他把真正的信仰等同于知识,而不是超越知识的东西。他作为哲学家的独特之处在于,他像斯宾诺莎一样是一个陶醉于上帝的知者,但又像康德一样是一个批判的认识论家。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
25.00%
发文量
12
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信