{"title":"Editor's Introduction","authors":"K. Ewing","doi":"10.1080/09615768.2021.1903690","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When the domestic history of the Covid-19 pandemic is written, a reasonable starting point will be the deep failures of the British State. These failures begin with the chronic lack of preparedness and the inadequate readiness of our public services. And they continue with slow reactions and ponderous decision-making, many people paying a heavy price as a result. A question government will have to answer is how much death and illness was avoidable. The failures of government in its subsequent response are wide-ranging and farreaching, whether it be the secrecy and alleged cronyism associated with procuring safety equipment for front line staff; the eye-watering expenditure of public money to pay for private contractors to run a much criticised test and trace system; or the predictable public health consequences of poor labour standards and unprotected workers. The United Kingdom suffered one of the highest death rates in the world, on a per capita basis. That was unlikely to be bad luck. It is more likely to be a consequence of government policy over many years which created the great structural problems on which the coronavirus preyed. These deep structural problems—poor health, bad and over-crowded housing, and low pay—may yet be shown to be the direct consequence of a decade of austerity, inequality and poverty. Much will be written about these problems and how they should be addressed in the future. But at the time of writing the British government shows no sign of having learned the lessons of failure. True, in the 2021 Budget the Chancellor committed vast sums of money to sustain the economy for another 12 months. But it now appears that the effect of the Budget at best will be to return to the status quo prepandemic. That is assuming optimistically of course that, at the time of writing with the rollout of vaccinations, we are at the beginning of the end-game, and the possibility of some aspects of life being re-normalised. But back to the past is no solution for the future, any more than it was after the Second World War, or the Great Depression, or the First World War. Nor does it honour the sacrifice that many have made, or the loss that many others have suffered. King’s Law Journal, 2021 Vol. 32, No. 1, 1–2, https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2021.1903690","PeriodicalId":88025,"journal":{"name":"King's law journal : KLJ","volume":"571 1","pages":"1 - 2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"King's law journal : KLJ","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2021.1903690","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
When the domestic history of the Covid-19 pandemic is written, a reasonable starting point will be the deep failures of the British State. These failures begin with the chronic lack of preparedness and the inadequate readiness of our public services. And they continue with slow reactions and ponderous decision-making, many people paying a heavy price as a result. A question government will have to answer is how much death and illness was avoidable. The failures of government in its subsequent response are wide-ranging and farreaching, whether it be the secrecy and alleged cronyism associated with procuring safety equipment for front line staff; the eye-watering expenditure of public money to pay for private contractors to run a much criticised test and trace system; or the predictable public health consequences of poor labour standards and unprotected workers. The United Kingdom suffered one of the highest death rates in the world, on a per capita basis. That was unlikely to be bad luck. It is more likely to be a consequence of government policy over many years which created the great structural problems on which the coronavirus preyed. These deep structural problems—poor health, bad and over-crowded housing, and low pay—may yet be shown to be the direct consequence of a decade of austerity, inequality and poverty. Much will be written about these problems and how they should be addressed in the future. But at the time of writing the British government shows no sign of having learned the lessons of failure. True, in the 2021 Budget the Chancellor committed vast sums of money to sustain the economy for another 12 months. But it now appears that the effect of the Budget at best will be to return to the status quo prepandemic. That is assuming optimistically of course that, at the time of writing with the rollout of vaccinations, we are at the beginning of the end-game, and the possibility of some aspects of life being re-normalised. But back to the past is no solution for the future, any more than it was after the Second World War, or the Great Depression, or the First World War. Nor does it honour the sacrifice that many have made, or the loss that many others have suffered. King’s Law Journal, 2021 Vol. 32, No. 1, 1–2, https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2021.1903690