Garbled-Circuits from an SCA Perspective: Free XOR can be Quite Expensive. .

I. Levi, Carmit Hazay
{"title":"Garbled-Circuits from an SCA Perspective: Free XOR can be Quite Expensive. .","authors":"I. Levi, Carmit Hazay","doi":"10.46586/tches.v2023.i2.54-79","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Garbling schemes, invented in the 80’s by Yao (FOCS’86), have been a versatile and fundamental tool in modern cryptography. A prominent application of garbled circuits is constant round secure two-party computation, which led to a long line of study of this object, where one of the most influential optimizations is Free-XOR (Kolesnikov and Schneider ICALP’08), introducing a global offset Δ for all garbled wire values where XOR gates are computed locally without garbling them. To date, garbling schemes were not studied per their side-channel attacks (SCA) security characteristics, even though SCA pose a significant security threat to cryptographic devices. In this research we, demonstrate that adversaries utilizing advanced SCA tools such as horizontal attacks, mixed with advanced hypothesis building and standard (vertical) SCA tools, can jeopardize garbling implementations.Our main observation is that garbling schemes utilizing a global secret Δ open a door to quite trivial side-channel attacks. We model our side-channel attacks on the garbler’s device and discuss the asymmetric setting where various computations are not performed on the evaluator side. This enables dangerous leakage extraction on the garbler and renders our attack impossible on the evaluator’s side.Theoretically, we first demonstrate on a simulated environment, that such attacks are quite devastating. Concretely, our attack is capable of extracting Δ when the circuit embeds only 8 input non-linear gates with fifth/first-order attack Success-Rates of 0.65/0.7. With as little as 3 such gates, our attack reduces the first-order Guessing Entropy of Δ from 128 to ∼ 48-bits. We further demonstrate our attack via an implementation and power measurements data over an STM 32-bit processor software implementing circuit garbling, and discuss their limitations and mitigation tactics on logical, protocol and implementation layers.","PeriodicalId":13186,"journal":{"name":"IACR Trans. Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Syst.","volume":"3 1","pages":"54-79"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IACR Trans. Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Syst.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2023.i2.54-79","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4

Abstract

Garbling schemes, invented in the 80’s by Yao (FOCS’86), have been a versatile and fundamental tool in modern cryptography. A prominent application of garbled circuits is constant round secure two-party computation, which led to a long line of study of this object, where one of the most influential optimizations is Free-XOR (Kolesnikov and Schneider ICALP’08), introducing a global offset Δ for all garbled wire values where XOR gates are computed locally without garbling them. To date, garbling schemes were not studied per their side-channel attacks (SCA) security characteristics, even though SCA pose a significant security threat to cryptographic devices. In this research we, demonstrate that adversaries utilizing advanced SCA tools such as horizontal attacks, mixed with advanced hypothesis building and standard (vertical) SCA tools, can jeopardize garbling implementations.Our main observation is that garbling schemes utilizing a global secret Δ open a door to quite trivial side-channel attacks. We model our side-channel attacks on the garbler’s device and discuss the asymmetric setting where various computations are not performed on the evaluator side. This enables dangerous leakage extraction on the garbler and renders our attack impossible on the evaluator’s side.Theoretically, we first demonstrate on a simulated environment, that such attacks are quite devastating. Concretely, our attack is capable of extracting Δ when the circuit embeds only 8 input non-linear gates with fifth/first-order attack Success-Rates of 0.65/0.7. With as little as 3 such gates, our attack reduces the first-order Guessing Entropy of Δ from 128 to ∼ 48-bits. We further demonstrate our attack via an implementation and power measurements data over an STM 32-bit processor software implementing circuit garbling, and discuss their limitations and mitigation tactics on logical, protocol and implementation layers.
从SCA的角度看乱码电路:免费的异或可能相当昂贵。
在80年代由Yao (FOCS ' 86)发明的乱码方案已经成为现代密码学中通用的基本工具。乱码电路的一个突出应用是恒定轮安全两方计算,这导致了对该对象的长期研究,其中最具影响力的优化之一是Free-XOR (Kolesnikov和Schneider ICALP ' 08),为所有乱码导线值引入全局偏移Δ,其中XOR门在本地计算而不乱码。迄今为止,尽管SCA对加密设备构成了严重的安全威胁,但还没有根据其侧信道攻击(SCA)的安全特征对乱码方案进行研究。在本研究中,我们演示了攻击者利用高级SCA工具(如水平攻击)与高级假设构建和标准(垂直)SCA工具相结合,可能危及乱码实现。我们的主要观察是,利用全局秘密Δ的乱码方案为相当微不足道的侧信道攻击打开了一扇门。我们对加码器设备上的侧信道攻击进行了建模,并讨论了不对称设置,其中在评估器侧不执行各种计算。这使得在加码器上进行危险的泄漏提取,并使我们的攻击无法在求值器方面进行。从理论上讲,我们首先在模拟环境中证明,这种攻击是相当具有破坏性的。具体来说,当电路只嵌入8个输入非线性门时,我们的攻击能够提取Δ,五阶/一阶攻击成功率为0.65/0.7。只需3个这样的门,我们的攻击将Δ的一阶猜测熵从128位降低到~ 48位。我们通过在STM 32位处理器软件上实现电路乱码的实现和功率测量数据进一步演示了我们的攻击,并讨论了它们在逻辑、协议和实现层上的局限性和缓解策略。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信