The Prospect Analysis of Sino-US Manufacturing Trade Friction Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

Abstract

The Sino-US trade friction since 2018 is an important turning point in trade relations between these two countries. As the world's two major manufacturing powers, the friction will have a profound impact on the world. This articlesorts out the comparison of economic and trade strength between these two countries in the past ten years, the dependence of import and export, and the changes in trade structure. Then we construct a dynamic evolutionary model of the strategic choices of these two countries in trade friction from the perspective of evolutionary game. Finally, we analyze the stability of the equilibrium point of the evolutionary game by copying the dynamic equation. The results show that when at least one of these two countries has a cooperative benefit less than the speculative benefits brought about by competition, (competition,competition) is the only evolutionary stable strategy combination, andboth of them will adopt competitive measures. The prerequisite for the combination of (cooperation, cooperation) strategies adopted by these two countries are that the net benefits obtained by the two countries' cooperation strategies are greater than the speculative benefits obtained when one side chooses to cooperate and the other side adopts competitive strategy. The probability that two countries choose cooperation strategy is directly proportional to benefits brought about by cooperation and inversely proportional to the cost of cooperation, the loss of sticking to the cooperation strategy, and the speculative benefits of abandoning cooperation. The trade policies of these two countries cannot be achieved overnight, but can gradually tend to be stable and balanced through mutual imitation and learning.