{"title":"Restructuring Lebanese Sovereign Debt: Tackling the Holdout Problem","authors":"Brenda Luo, Chris Smith, A. Xiao","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3575063","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Lebanon can threaten to take the following three actions to restructure its debt and weaken the position of a potential holdout creditor, such as the Ashmore Group, that holds more than 25% of the outstanding debt. \n \nFirst, unilaterally amend the terms of the Fiscal Agency Agreement pursuant to Para. 23.1 to allow bondholders representing a simple majority of the outstanding debt to amend non-core terms, contrary to the 75% required to pass an extraordinary resolution. \n \nSecond, initiate the debt restructuring through a debt exchange program with an exit consent that requires participating bondholders to vote to amend the two non-core terms in the Fiscal Agency Agreement: (1) amend the forum selection clause to ensure that in the event of default, the creditor may only bring a lawsuit against the debtor in a Lebanese court (para. 8.3); (2) remove the pari passu clause (para. 3). \n \nThird, the Lebanese Parliament enacts a law effectively accomplishing that (1) the New bonds are senior to the Old Bonds; (2) the government may make selective payments on its senior debt until they are paid in full without resulting in default on junior claims; (3) successful creditor-litigants have the obligation to apply the proceeds of a successful judgment against Lebanon to senior creditors. \n \nIn the event that Lebanon fails in these three actions, Lebanon can still rely on the necessity doctrine as an affirmative defense.","PeriodicalId":44862,"journal":{"name":"American Bankruptcy Law Journal","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2020-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Bankruptcy Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3575063","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Lebanon can threaten to take the following three actions to restructure its debt and weaken the position of a potential holdout creditor, such as the Ashmore Group, that holds more than 25% of the outstanding debt.
First, unilaterally amend the terms of the Fiscal Agency Agreement pursuant to Para. 23.1 to allow bondholders representing a simple majority of the outstanding debt to amend non-core terms, contrary to the 75% required to pass an extraordinary resolution.
Second, initiate the debt restructuring through a debt exchange program with an exit consent that requires participating bondholders to vote to amend the two non-core terms in the Fiscal Agency Agreement: (1) amend the forum selection clause to ensure that in the event of default, the creditor may only bring a lawsuit against the debtor in a Lebanese court (para. 8.3); (2) remove the pari passu clause (para. 3).
Third, the Lebanese Parliament enacts a law effectively accomplishing that (1) the New bonds are senior to the Old Bonds; (2) the government may make selective payments on its senior debt until they are paid in full without resulting in default on junior claims; (3) successful creditor-litigants have the obligation to apply the proceeds of a successful judgment against Lebanon to senior creditors.
In the event that Lebanon fails in these three actions, Lebanon can still rely on the necessity doctrine as an affirmative defense.