Sybil-Resistant Meta Strategies for the Forwarder's Dilemma

Y. Durmus, Andreas Loukas, E. Onur, K. Langendoen
{"title":"Sybil-Resistant Meta Strategies for the Forwarder's Dilemma","authors":"Y. Durmus, Andreas Loukas, E. Onur, K. Langendoen","doi":"10.1109/SASO.2014.21","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Cooperation is the foundation of wireless ad hoc networks with nodes forwarding their neighbors' packets for the common good. However, energy and bandwidth constraints combined with selfish behaviour lead to collapsed networks where all nodes defect. Researchers have tried to incentivize or enforce the nodes for cooperation in various ways. However, these techniques do not consider the heterogeneous networks in which a diverse set of nodes with different cognitive capabilities exist. Furthermore, in ad hoc networks identity is a fuzzy concept. It is easy to forge multiple identities and hide defective behaviour. Moreover, the nature of the wireless medium is always ambiguous due to collisions, interference and asymmetric links. In all this uncertainty, having complete information about the intentions of the nodes and acting on it is not straightforward. Backed by evolutionary game theory and multi-agent systems research, we adapt and modify two meta strategies to embrace this uncertainty. These modified meta strategies, Win Stay Loose Shift and Stochastic Imitate Best Strategy, do not require strict identity information and only depend on nodes' own capabilities. Nodes monitor the traffic in their neighbourhood by using a two-hop overhearing method, and decide whether they should be cooperative or defective. We show that nodes are able to discover and use the best strategy in their locality and protect themselves against the exploitation by free riders who devise Sybil attacks by changing their identities.","PeriodicalId":6458,"journal":{"name":"2014 IEEE Eighth International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems Workshops","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2014 IEEE Eighth International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems Workshops","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SASO.2014.21","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Cooperation is the foundation of wireless ad hoc networks with nodes forwarding their neighbors' packets for the common good. However, energy and bandwidth constraints combined with selfish behaviour lead to collapsed networks where all nodes defect. Researchers have tried to incentivize or enforce the nodes for cooperation in various ways. However, these techniques do not consider the heterogeneous networks in which a diverse set of nodes with different cognitive capabilities exist. Furthermore, in ad hoc networks identity is a fuzzy concept. It is easy to forge multiple identities and hide defective behaviour. Moreover, the nature of the wireless medium is always ambiguous due to collisions, interference and asymmetric links. In all this uncertainty, having complete information about the intentions of the nodes and acting on it is not straightforward. Backed by evolutionary game theory and multi-agent systems research, we adapt and modify two meta strategies to embrace this uncertainty. These modified meta strategies, Win Stay Loose Shift and Stochastic Imitate Best Strategy, do not require strict identity information and only depend on nodes' own capabilities. Nodes monitor the traffic in their neighbourhood by using a two-hop overhearing method, and decide whether they should be cooperative or defective. We show that nodes are able to discover and use the best strategy in their locality and protect themselves against the exploitation by free riders who devise Sybil attacks by changing their identities.
货代困境的抗sybil元策略
合作是无线自组织网络的基础,节点为了共同利益转发邻居的数据包。然而,能量和带宽的限制加上自私行为导致网络崩溃,所有节点都存在缺陷。研究人员试图以各种方式激励或强制节点进行合作。然而,这些技术并没有考虑到异构网络中存在的具有不同认知能力的不同节点集。此外,在自组织网络中,身份是一个模糊的概念。伪造多重身份和隐藏有缺陷的行为是很容易的。此外,由于碰撞、干扰和不对称链路,无线媒体的性质总是模糊的。在所有这些不确定性中,获得有关节点意图的完整信息并据此采取行动并非易事。在进化博弈论和多智能体系统研究的支持下,我们调整和修改了两种元策略来接受这种不确定性。这些改进的元策略,Win Stay Loose Shift和随机模仿最佳策略,不需要严格的身份信息,只依赖于节点自己的能力。节点采用两跳监听的方法监控其邻居的流量,并决定它们是合作还是有缺陷。我们表明节点能够发现并使用他们所在地区的最佳策略,并通过改变他们的身份来保护自己免受设计Sybil攻击的搭便车者的利用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信