Against Truthmaker Necessitarianism

IF 0.3 3区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Logique et Analyse Pub Date : 2016-01-01 DOI:10.2143/LEA.233.0.3149530

R. Stenwall

引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper is an argument against Truthmaker Necessitarianism — the doctrine that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of the proposition it makes true. Armstrong’s sufficiency argument for necessitarianism is examined and shown to be question begging. It is then argued in detail that truthmaking is a matter of grounding truth and that grounding is a dependency relation that neither entails nor reduces to necessitation.

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反对真理制造者的必要主义

本文是对真理制造者必然主义的一种论证。真理制造者必然主义认为，真理制造者的存在必须使它所认定的命题为真。阿姆斯特朗对必需品主义的充分性论证被检验并被证明是问题乞求。然后详细地论证说，造真是真理的基础问题，而基础是一种依赖关系，既不需要也不降低为必然性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Logique et Analyse PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Logique et Analyse is the continuation of Bulletin Intérieur, which was published from 1954 on by the Belgian National Centre for Logical Investigation, and intended originally only as an internal publication of results for its members and collaborators. Since the start of the new series, in 1958, however, the journal has been open to external submissions (and subscriptions). Logique et Analyse itself subscribes to no particular logical or philosophical doctrine, and so is open to articles from all points of view, provided only that they concern the designated subject matter of the journal.