Government Corruption and Corporate Social Responsibility: An Instrumental Perspective

IF 0.7 Q4 MANAGEMENT
C. Qian, David H. Weng, L. Lu, Xuejun Jiang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between government corruption and corporate social responsibility (CSR). While existing research in CSR has suggested that reduced moral incentive is a key reason for firms’ low CSR engagement in regions with high government corruption, we postulate that government corruption in the region where a firm is headquartered also decreases its instrumental motivation to engage in CSR. The instrumental value of CSR will significantly decrease due to the diminished returns, which come from decreased stakeholder reciprocation and increased risk of becoming a rent-seeking target of corrupt officials. We furthermore suggest that the negative effect of government corruption on CSR may change depending on the levels of firm political risk, financial performance, and firm sales to government, which alter the returns of CSR. The findings, based on a sample of publicly listed US firms and political corruption data from the US Department of Justice during the 2003 through 2013 period, support our arguments. Our study contributes to CSR literature by highlighting and testing the instrumental perspective to examine the influence of government corruption on CSR.
政府腐败与企业社会责任:工具视角
本研究探讨政府腐败与企业社会责任之间的关系。虽然现有的企业社会责任研究表明,在政府腐败严重的地区,道德激励的减少是企业社会责任参与度低的一个关键原因,但我们假设,企业总部所在地区的政府腐败也会降低企业参与社会责任的工具动机。由于收益减少,企业社会责任的工具价值将显著降低,这来自于利益相关者的回报减少,以及成为腐败官员寻租目标的风险增加。政府腐败对企业社会责任的负面影响可能取决于企业的政治风险水平、财务绩效水平和企业对政府的销售水平,这些水平会改变企业社会责任的回报。调查结果基于美国上市公司样本和美国司法部2003年至2013年期间的政治腐败数据,支持了我们的观点。我们的研究通过强调和检验工具视角来考察政府腐败对企业社会责任的影响,从而为企业社会责任文献做出了贡献。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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自引率
20.00%
发文量
7
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