LAJPCIŠKI PROCESI – PRILOG PROUČAVANJU ISTORIJE MEĐUNARODNOG KRIVIČNOG PRAVA

Abstract

The historical development of International Criminal Law in the period leading up to the First World War was of negliable value, especially when compared to the post-war period from 1918 to 1939. In Versailles Europe matured an idea, whose roots stemmed from much earlier, an idea of establishing an International Criminal Court which would protect basic human values, shared by all states no matter the form of government or political affiliations. Having noticed the link between world conflict and the development of International Criminal Law comes the conclusion that this idea first came to life after the Great War in 1918. This is how for the first time in history an institute of responsibility was formed for the rulers and military commanders concerning the war crimes committed by the state - these first examples being the trial of German Kaiser Vilhelm II and the individual Leipzig trials involving officers of the German army. Although the Kaisers trial was a failed attempt, and the Leipzig trials are considered failures due to material and formal deficiencies, especially concerning their outcomes, these parts represented an experimental phase of a historical process crucial to the forming of the international criminal justice system. Europe was aware that the modus operandi taken in this direction didn’t pass the test, and that the state and economy matters would always come first in the Versailles world. However, the repetition of this scenario wasn’t allowed during the Second World War and we can confidently say that the Nuremberg trials found their foundations stemming from Leipzig’s lessons. In the European law legacy Leipzig created the first written documents which would serve as waypoints in the further codification of International Criminal Law. Lastly, it can be said that in the period from 1918 to 1939 the European policy was introduced to the problem of realising that all further processes leading to the constitution of a uniform and legitimate international criminal justice system would undeniably lead to the redefining of two fundamental dogmas of international order: the principle of (absolute) state sovereignty and the (non)existence of international law subjectivity (and therefore the responsibility) of an individual.