Something old, something new? Votes of confidence, parliamentary dissolution, election timing, and judicial review under the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022

Q2 Arts and Humanities
Francesco Bromo
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACT Westminster ratified the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act in 2022. It provides that: (a) PMs’ ability to dissolve parliament through the monarch is restored. (b) Writs for general elections are bestowed upon the executive. (c) Some applications of the royal prerogative are non-justiciable. This article presents a critical summary of the history and content of the act, and it discusses its implications. (1) The repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act re-introduces flexibility vis-à-vis election timing. (2) The DCPA implies a transfer of dissolution authority from parliament back to governments. (3) The elimination of statutory confidence motions implies a return to the convention-based confidence procedure. This article argues that the bill rekindles cabinet supremacy. (i) Elections can be more easily strategically scheduled to the ruling party’s advantage. (ii) PMs can substantiate the employment of confidence votes with the threat of dissolution again. (iii) Leaders might capitalise on the absence of judicial review to further their agenda or elude the test of confidence. Altogether, the bill reshapes the relationship between the government and the legislature by deepening executive dominance to pre-FTPA levels and perhaps even higher, given the non-justiciability clause, at least as long as elections produce single-party majority cabinets.
旧的,新的?根据《2022年解散和召集国会法案》进行信任投票、议会解散、选举时间安排和司法审查
威斯敏斯特于2022年批准了《解散和召集议会法》。它规定:(a)恢复首相通过君主解散议会的权力。(b)普选令状授予行政长官。(c)王室特权的某些适用是不可审理的。本文对该法案的历史和内容进行了批判性总结,并讨论了其含义。(1)废除《定期议会法》重新引入了-à-vis选举时间的灵活性。DCPA意味着将解散权从议会转回政府。(3)取消法定信任动议意味着恢复以惯例为基础的信任程序。本文认为,该法案重新点燃了内阁至上主义。(i)选举可以更容易地在战略上安排对执政党有利的时间。(二)总理可以再次以解散威胁来证明使用信任投票。(三)领导人可能利用缺乏司法审查来推进其议程或逃避信任考验。总之,只要选举产生一党占多数的内阁,该法案通过将行政主导地位深化到《自由贸易协定》之前的水平,甚至可能更高,重塑了政府与立法机构之间的关系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Parliaments, Estates and Representation
Parliaments, Estates and Representation Social Sciences-Sociology and Political Science
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
28
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