Nikolaos Pantelaios, Nick Nikiforakis, A. Kapravelos
{"title":"You've Changed: Detecting Malicious Browser Extensions through their Update Deltas","authors":"Nikolaos Pantelaios, Nick Nikiforakis, A. Kapravelos","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3423343","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we conduct the largest to-date analysis of browser extensions, by investigating 922,684 different extension versions collected in the past six years, and using this data to discover malicious versions of extensions. We propose a two-stage system that first identifies malicious extensions based on anomalous extension ratings and locates the code that was added to a benign extension in order to make it malicious. We encode these code deltas according to the APIs that they abuse and search our historical dataset for other similar deltas of extensions which have not yet been flagged, neither by users nor by Chrome's Web Store. We were able to discover 143 malicious extensions belonging to 21 malicious clusters, exhibiting a wide range of abuse, from history stealing and ad injection, to the hijacking of new tabs and search engines. Our results show that our proposed techniques operate in an abuse-agnostic way and can identify malicious extensions that are evading detection.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"105 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"19","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3423343","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 19
Abstract
In this paper, we conduct the largest to-date analysis of browser extensions, by investigating 922,684 different extension versions collected in the past six years, and using this data to discover malicious versions of extensions. We propose a two-stage system that first identifies malicious extensions based on anomalous extension ratings and locates the code that was added to a benign extension in order to make it malicious. We encode these code deltas according to the APIs that they abuse and search our historical dataset for other similar deltas of extensions which have not yet been flagged, neither by users nor by Chrome's Web Store. We were able to discover 143 malicious extensions belonging to 21 malicious clusters, exhibiting a wide range of abuse, from history stealing and ad injection, to the hijacking of new tabs and search engines. Our results show that our proposed techniques operate in an abuse-agnostic way and can identify malicious extensions that are evading detection.
在本文中,我们对浏览器扩展进行了迄今为止最大规模的分析,通过调查过去六年中收集的922,684种不同的扩展版本,并使用这些数据来发现恶意扩展版本。我们提出了一个两阶段系统,首先根据异常扩展评级识别恶意扩展,并定位添加到良性扩展中的代码,以使其成为恶意扩展。我们根据他们滥用的api对这些代码增量进行编码,并在我们的历史数据集中搜索其他尚未被用户和Chrome Web Store标记的类似扩展增量。我们能够发现属于21个恶意集群的143个恶意扩展,展示了广泛的滥用,从历史记录窃取和广告注入,到劫持新标签和搜索引擎。我们的结果表明,我们提出的技术以一种滥用不可知的方式运行,并且可以识别逃避检测的恶意扩展。