The Mitigating Effect of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on the Voluntary Adoption of Clawback Policies

Yan Zhang, Nan Zhou
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Clawback policies are compensation recovery policies that provide companies with the ability to recoup incentive-based compensation in the event of a financial fraud. We investigate whether the mandatory clawback provision in the Dodd-Frank Act is necessary or whether existing provisions under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) are sufficient in inducing problematic firms to voluntarily adopt clawbacks. Specifically, we examine the relation between financial expertise on audit committees and voluntary adoption of clawback policies in the pre-Dodd-Frank period, separating audit committee financial expertise into accounting- and non-accounting financial expertise and classifying clawbacks into fraud-based- and non-fraud based clawbacks. While firms with restatement history are more likely to adopt fraud-based clawbacks due to SOX Section 304, the financial expertise on audit committees has a mitigating effect on the voluntary adoption of clawback policies. Greater accounting financial expertise is more likely to result in voluntary adoption of fraud-based clawbacks for firms without prior restatements. On the contrary, accounting and non-financial expertise are less likely to result in the voluntary adoption of fraud-based clawbacks for firms with prior restatements. Consistent with the signaling hypothesis, this suggests that accounting experts are more in favor of adopting fraud-based clawbacks when they are not associated with any previous accounting scandals, whereas both accounting experts and non-financial experts are against adopting fraud-based clawbacks when they could be implicated by prior financial frauds. Since non-fraud based clawbacks do not serve as signals, neither accounting- nor non-accounting financial expertise is related to the adoption of non-fraud based clawbacks. Our results suggest that the mandatory clawback requirement in Dodd-Frank can eliminate the mitigating effect of audit committee financial expertise on the voluntary adoption of clawback policies.
审计委员会财务专门知识对自愿采用追回政策的缓解作用
追回政策是一种补偿政策,它使公司能够在发生财务欺诈的情况下收回基于激励的补偿。我们调查多德-弗兰克法案中的强制性追回条款是否必要,或者萨班斯-奥克斯利法案(SOX)下的现有条款是否足以诱导有问题的公司自愿采用追回。具体而言,我们研究了多德-弗兰克法案出台前审计委员会的财务专业知识与自愿采用追回政策之间的关系,将审计委员会的财务专业知识分为会计和非会计财务专业知识,并将追回分为基于欺诈和非欺诈的追回。虽然有重述历史的公司更有可能由于SOX第304条而采用基于欺诈的追回,但审计委员会的财务专业知识对自愿采用追回政策具有缓解作用。更高的会计财务专业知识更有可能导致没有事先重述的公司自愿采用基于欺诈的追回。相反,会计和非金融专业知识不太可能导致有先前重述的公司自愿采用基于欺诈的追回。与信号假设一致,这表明会计专家更倾向于在与以往任何会计丑闻无关的情况下采用基于欺诈的追回,而会计专家和非金融专家都反对在可能与以前的财务欺诈有关的情况下采用基于欺诈的追回。由于非基于欺诈的追回不能作为信号,会计和非会计财务专业知识都与采用非基于欺诈的追回无关。我们的研究结果表明,多德-弗兰克法案中的强制性追回要求可以消除审计委员会财务专业知识对自愿采用追回政策的缓解作用。
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