Fraud and Abuse in the Paycheck Protection Program? Evidence from Investment Advisory Firms

William Beggs, Thuong Harvison
{"title":"Fraud and Abuse in the Paycheck Protection Program? Evidence from Investment Advisory Firms","authors":"William Beggs, Thuong Harvison","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3647606","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the nature and magnitude of abuse in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP or the Program) using PPP loans made to 2,999 investment advisory firms registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The data suggest that PPP abuse was relatively widespread as approximately 25% of firms receiving PPP loans indicated they would retain more jobs in their loan application than the number of employees they disclosed on their most recent regulatory filing (Form ADV). We show an existing model of investment advisor fraud predicts the most egregious PPP loans at a rate similar to actual cases of fraud. Investment advisors abusing the Program were significantly more likely to disclose a history of past fraud and other legal and/or regulatory misconduct. Using a conservative approach, we estimate that more than 6% of the $590 million in PPP funds received by SEC registered investment advisors consisted of overallocations to firms abusing the Program. We test a variety of hypotheses to shed further light on the nature of PPP abuse.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"449 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Financial Accounting eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3647606","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7

Abstract

This study investigates the nature and magnitude of abuse in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP or the Program) using PPP loans made to 2,999 investment advisory firms registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The data suggest that PPP abuse was relatively widespread as approximately 25% of firms receiving PPP loans indicated they would retain more jobs in their loan application than the number of employees they disclosed on their most recent regulatory filing (Form ADV). We show an existing model of investment advisor fraud predicts the most egregious PPP loans at a rate similar to actual cases of fraud. Investment advisors abusing the Program were significantly more likely to disclose a history of past fraud and other legal and/or regulatory misconduct. Using a conservative approach, we estimate that more than 6% of the $590 million in PPP funds received by SEC registered investment advisors consisted of overallocations to firms abusing the Program. We test a variety of hypotheses to shed further light on the nature of PPP abuse.
工资保障计划中的欺诈和滥用?来自投资咨询公司的证据
本研究利用向2999家在美国证券交易委员会(SEC)注册的投资咨询公司提供的PPP贷款,调查了工资保护计划(PPP或该计划)滥用的性质和程度。数据表明,PPP滥用相对普遍,约25%接受PPP贷款的公司表示,他们在贷款申请中保留的工作岗位比他们在最近的监管文件(表格ADV)中披露的员工数量要多。我们展示了一个现有的投资顾问欺诈模型,以与实际欺诈案件相似的速度预测最令人震惊的PPP贷款。滥用该计划的投资顾问更有可能披露过去的欺诈历史和其他法律和/或监管不当行为。使用保守的方法,我们估计,在美国证券交易委员会注册投资顾问收到的5.9亿美元PPP资金中,超过6%的资金被过度分配给了滥用该计划的公司。我们测试了各种假设,以进一步阐明购买力平价滥用的本质。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信